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This report is designed to provide Committee members 
and the public with a comprehensive background on the issue 
of prospective (automatic) conformity of California income 
tax laws with the federal Internal Revenue Code. 
A discussion of the specific issues of conformity of 
California law with the recent federal changes made in the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 will be the subject of 
subsequent reports. 
The issue of automatic conformity has been before the 
Legislature for a number of years. Almost every session of 
the Legislature has been presented with such a proposal. In 
1966 and 1968, the measures were submitted to the electorate 
and rejected. 
There have been a number of studies and reports on the 
subject (see Appendix II). In 1980, the Assembly Committee 
on Revenue and Taxation held an interim hearing on SCA 31 
(Mills) and the background briefing book for that hearing, 
entitled "Federal Income Tax Conformity", is still available 
through the Assembly Publications Office. 
When SCA 14 by Senator Mills was before the Committee 
again in 1981, the Committee felt the need for another interim 
hearing on the subject, as a majority of the membership of the 
Committee has changed since 1980. 
i 
One of the problems encountered in preparing this brief-
ing book was the development of data on the shifts in tax 
burden and revenue effects of conformity. Due to the mass 
changes federal tax law enacted in August of 1981, data used 
in the Committee's 1980 study are obsolete. Data illustrating 
the tax shifts by income class which would result from confor-
mity with the new federal law are not yet available. We are 
hopeful that the staff of the Franchise Tax Board will have 
some of this information ready for presentation to the 
Committee on October 29, 1981. 
This briefing book was prepared by David R. Doerr of the 
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee staff. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Preface i 
ISSUES 1 
The Issue of Automatic Conformity • • • • • • • • 2 
SCA 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
What is Conformity . . . 
Selective Conformity . . ..... 
Automatic Conformity 
Constitutional Question 
Prior Public Votes in California . 
Practice in Other States . . . . . 
Rationale for Automatic Conformity . 




. . 5 
• • 5 
• 5 
Increased Taxpayer Simplicity: A Matter . . . .. 6 
of Degree 
Loss of State Control Over Tax Policy . . . . . . 7 
Significant Shifts in Tax Burden or 
Major Revenue Loss . . . . . 
State Budget and Revenue Instability . 
Additional Problems ... 
APPENDICIES 
I Text of SCA 14 (Mills) 
II Published State Studies on Federal 
8 
. • . 8 
• 9 
. . . 11 
Conformity . . . .. 14 
III Legislative Counsel Opinion on 
Constitutionality of Automatic 
Conformity, October 19, 1959 ...... 16 
IV Legislative Counsel Opinion on 
Constitutionality of Automatic 
Conformity, September 30, 1980 ..... 25 
v Report on Income Tax Conformity 
"Piggybacking" Under the California 
Constitution, Prof. G. T. Schwartz, 
UCLA Law School, April 9, 1980 ..... 33 
; ~ ; 
VI Prior Ballot Issues: 
Prop. 14 (Nov. 8, 1966) 
Prop. 4 (Nov 5, 1968) 
Text, Legislative Counsel's 
Analysis and Ballot Statements . . • 109 
VII Article, Wall Street Journal, 





California law is currently in substantial conformance 
with federal income tax law although there are major areas 
of difference. As each federal law change is made, the 
Legislature revises state law only as it deems appropriate. 
Some state laws are enacted to suit particular state needs 
and have no federal counterpart . 
1. Is an amendment to the Constitution needed to per-
mit the state to conform prospectively to federal 
tax law? 
2. Should the Legislature be given the authority to 
conform prospectively to federal tax law? 
3. Is prospective conformity to federal tax law 




st , C has 
usted gross income and taxab 
these finitions con 
ons. In certain areas, as 
, the two laws are quite di rent. Californ 
ly reviews each fede change to if 
prospe ve conformity is desirable. State 
not change automatically as federal law 
i Counsel has opined that a consti 
ment would be required to permit automatic 
to federal changes. Two such proposed 
were defeated by the voters in the latter 1960s. 
SCA 14 (Mills) authorizes the slature 
and collecting" of personal 
by reference sent 
tions, i.e., "federal 
is authorized to make 
nitions, for state tax purposes. 
for text of the SCA. 








" tax jargon 
Tax law after the 
many, the 
conformity", which can 
extent by a number of p 
are examined 
largely 
1 law, but result 
cedure. The current degree of con 
of a termined effort by the 
s to fede law 
to comparable 
to conformity is known as " le 
II 
Se 
ce 1 s 
enactment of California Personal Income Tax law 
was formalized as a policy a extens 
conducted by the Revenue and Taxation Committees 
houses during the 1960's. Appendix II s 
state conformity studies of the past 20 
conclus 
2 
Under this approach, the Legislature attempts to achieve 
the highest degree of conformity practical and desirable, 
but exercises its authority to adopt federal changes 
which are deemed desirable for it and reject those which 
are deemed undesirable for various reasons. In addition, 
the Legislature is free to adopt special tax provisions 
which have no federal counterpart, when necessary, to meet 
the needs and best interests of California. 
Automatic Conformity 
There are three basic approaches to automatic conformity. 
a. Adopt Federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). By adopt-
ing AGI, the state would be left with its own itemized 
or standard deductions, tax credits and tax rates. 
b. Adopt Federal Taxable Income (TI). The taxable income 
approach goes one step further, by conforming to the 
federal zero bracket amount and itemized deductions. 
In its "pure" form, AGI or TI conformity would be 
total, but either approach leaves open the possibility 
for various adjustments to be made by the state. Of 
course, the more adjustments, the greater the complex-
ity reintroduced. 
c. Piggyback Approach. This is the highest degree of 
simplicity, as the state tax becomes a percentage 
(flat rate or graduated schedule) of federal tax 
liability. This approach is what most lay persons 
have in mind when they refer to "federal tax confor-
mity". 
The Chart on the following page illustrates, for the Cali-
fornia tax, the relationship among AGI, TI, and tax 
liability. 
Constitutional Question 
A procedural question that has lingered since 1959 is 
whether automatic conformity must be achieved via con-
stitutional amendment, or may be enacted by statute alone. 
The question is yet to be resolved. 
On October 19, 1959, the Office of Legislative Counsel 
issued an opinion to the effect that automatic conformity 
of the California law to future federal law would be an 
unconstitutional delegation of the state's legislative 
power to Congress. An updated opinion submitted September 
30, 1980 came to the same conclusion: prospective confor-
mity requires a constitutional amendment. (See Appen-
dices III and IV,respectively.) 
A countervailing opinion is held by Prof. Gary T. Schwartz 
of the UCLA Law School, who argues in a recent paper 
(Appendix v ) that there is a "very good reason to believe 
that an open-ended conformity statute would be held con-





review of case law, much of it since the 1959 Counsel's 
opinion. He states that whatever doubt still exists, 
however, would be cured by an appropriate amendment to 
the state constitution. Schwartz and Counsel do agree 
that conformity to federal law at a given point in time 
can be enacted statutorily. 
All of the measures considered by this Committee in the 
1979-80 session were, or were linked to, constitutional 
amendments. 
Prior Publ Votes in California 
California voters have twice had the opportunity to 
approve automatic conformity by constitutional amend-
ment, in 1966 and again in 1968. However, these proposals 
were rejected both times, and by a larger margin on the 
second occasion. Proposition 14 of 1966 failed by a vote 
of 2,536,770 to 2,709,071 (48.4%- 51.6%) and Proposition 4 
of 1968 went down by a margin of 2,881,249 - 3,190,542 
(47.4%- 52.6%). (Refer to Appendix VI.) 
Practice in Other States 
California is one of 8 of the 40 broad-based income tax 
states (as of October 1978) which does not refer by 
statute to the Internal Revenue Code as a starting point 
for computing its personal income tax return. 
Of the remaining 32 states, 22 use federal AGI as a 
starting point, six others use federal taxable income 
as a starting point, and four use a percentage of the 
federal tax as a starting point. However, each of these 
states make adjustments from this starting point and some 
adjustments are substantial. This tends to offset the 
simplicity of using a federal starting point. 
Further, during the past several years about one-third 
of the 32 states have "frozen" the federal law as of a 
specific date for their purposes, requiring legislative 
action for the adoption of new federal changes. The 
''freezing" approach is not unlike California's "selec-
tive conformity" approach, in that new federal changes 
are made subject to legislative review to determine the 
impact on tax policy, tax shifts and state revenues. 
Rationale for Automatic Conformity 
The main organized push for automatic conformity has 
been from the legal and accounting professions, which 
express dissatisfaction with the end product of the 
current "selective/piecemeal" conformity approach. Their 
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Significant fts In Tax Burden Or Major Revenue Loss 
automatic conformity plan, proponents 
a loped to bring in the 1 
b. 
revenue This would result in major tax 
Californians would pay increased state income 
le others would get major tax reduc 
be devised under which most 
have a tax increase. This approach would 
a very substantial state revenue loss, 
of millions of dollars. 
Some of the tax shifts that can occur under automat 
• 
are: 
higher-income taxpayers to lower-income 
This shift occurs because the state tax 
more progressive than the federal tax 
state taxpayers. 
e A from single to married taxpayers. This shift 
is partial "marriage penalty" which still 
r federal law but not at the state level. 
• A from taxpayers claiming more dependents to those 
c fewer. This shift results from substituting 
the $1,000 federal personal exemption for the state's 
tax credit ($11 in 1981). 
State Budget Revenue Instability 
With conformity to federal income tax , major 
fede changes will have a major impact on state income 






to an August 13, 1981, Wall Street Jo article 
x VII) ,the recent federal tax reduction act has 
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three or tax revisions--the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and 
the Revenue Act of 1978--were enacted on October 4 and 
October 14, respectively. Both dates fall beyond the close 
of the state legislative session. The most recent change, 
the Federal Economic Tax Recovery Act was adopted on 
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AMENDED IN 23, 
Senate Constitutional Amendment 14 
Introduced by Senators Mills, 
Assemblyman 
February 18, 1981 
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 14-A resolution to 
propose to the people of the State of California an 
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by adding 
Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, relating to taxation. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SCA 14, as amended, Mills. Income tax. 
Existing provisions of the California Constitution provide 
that the Legislature may impose income taxes. 
This measure would authorize the Legislature to simplify 
the reporting and collecting of state personal taxes by 
incorporating federal law into state law. 
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
Sta~e-mandated local program: no. 
1 Resolved by the Senate~ the Assembly concurring, That 
2 the Legislature of of California at its 1981-82 
3 Regular Session on first day of 
4 December, 1980, two-thirds the members elected to 
5 each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor, 
6 hereby proposes to the people of of California 
7 that the Constitution of the adding 
8 Section 26.6 to Article XIII, to read: 
9 ~ 
10 SEC 26.6. Notwithstanding any 
11 contained in this Constitution, the 
12 
SCA 14 -2-
1 simplify the reporting and collecting of California 
2 personal income taxes by incorporating into state law by 
3 reference to any provision of the laws of the United States 
4 as such laws are or become effective at any time, or as 
5 such laws are amended from time to time. The 
6 Legislature may prescribe modifications or exceptions 
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PUBLISHED STA'l'E STUDIES Cl': 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY----
Report of Senate Fact 
Finding Committee on 
Revenue and Taxation: 
Conformity of California 
Personal Income and Bank 
Corporation Franchise 
Taxes with the Federal 
Internal Revenue Code 
Final Report of the 
Assembly Interim Commit-
tee on Revenue and 
Taxation 
Dr. Corrine Lathrop 
Gilb's Report for the 
Assembly Interim 
Committee on Revenue 
and Taxation: Conformity 
of State Personal Income 
Tax Laws to Federal 
Personal Income Tax 
Laws 
California Advisory 
Commission on Tax Re-
form (Flournoy Commis-
sion) 
Staff Report to Senate 
Committee on Revenue and 
Taxation on Bills and 
Constitutional Amend-
ments Referred in 1968 
to the Committee for 
Study 
Preliminary Report of 
the Legislative-Execu-
tive Tax Study Group 
Franchise Tax Board 
staff report: Should 
California Abandon its 
Current Select~ve Con-
formity Poli~ for 
Automatic Co~ormity? 
Final Report of the 
Commission on Govern-
mental Reform (Post 
Commission) 
15 
Re colwnendc1 t ion ----------
Adopt p~ljcy that conformity 
be achieved wherever 
pract~cable Rnd desir&ble. 
(Pg. :t:33) 
Continue policy of attempting 
to achieve highest degree 
of conformity between federal 
and state laws as may be 
pract~cal and desirable. 
(pg. 56) 
Adopt method which provides 
the maximum conformity for 
the convenience of the tax-
payer consistent with needs 
for predictability and 
control over revenue by the 
state; (Vol. 4, No. 10, 
Part 3, pg. 8) 
No specific recommendation 
but opposed blind conformity 
as optimum objective. 
(Vol. I, pg. 6) 
Continue policy recommended 
in 1961 report. 
Full conformity contains 
•grave flaws• (pgs. 102-104) 
Continue policy of selective 
conformity while seeking 
simplification of state law 
and promoting greater tax 
equity (pg. 11) 
Opposed full •piggybacking• 
but recommended •use of a 
modi!ied form of piggyback-
ing .•• ~y specific adjust-
ments to the •adjusted 
gross income,. reported to 
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Constitutional Problems Involved in 
Conforming California's Personal 
or.1e and Bank and Corporation 'l'ax 
t·1i th Federal Inc orne 'fax Law 
#504 
LAW,.l.hCP G. ALt..YH 
VIRGINIA COttill 
J. GOUI..D 
[DS~L W. IIAW" 
Roet~~CT G. Hit. SHAW 
Ow£H K KUN• 
ERN«SV H. KU'<ll 
ANN M. MACKIIV 
RYAH M. POLSTRA 
EDWARD K. PURC!rLI 
A~Y H. WHITAKER 
Aos<r WOODS 
The question has been asked: that constitutional 
prcblems. if any, would confront the Le~islature in re-
cr1ting California's ~ersonal Income Tax La~ (n. & T.C. 
Sec. 17001 and following) and Bank and Corporation Tax La\1 
(R .. & T .. c. Sec. 23001 and fcllm: ing) to 1t1a!~e these lat!S 
conferral uith the Federal inccr.:e tax la~; ( Interne1l Revenue 
Code of 1954, Subtitle A, co~mencing at Sec. 1)! 
1. Delegation of Legislative Power 
A revision of the California la~s as indicated 
would present the 9roblem of an unconstitutional del~3a­
tion of the State•s lecislative power to the Congres~ of 
the United States should it provide for the automatic in-
clusion proa~ective congressional legislation. 
The State Legislature is vested uith a generally 
nondeleBable pet:er to r!:ake lavJB for the State of Califo~nia 
(see 11 Cal. Jur. 2d 481; and Calif. Const., Art. III). 
The California courts have Looked upon this as ~rohibiting 
the Legislature fro1:1 providing for the automatic incor;>ora-
tion by reference of the future ar.;endli:ents of the lat·:s of 
any other jurisdiction. As the court stated in Erock v. 
Super Court (1937), 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297: 
" ••• It is, of course, perfectly valid to 
ad t existing statutes, rules or regulations 
of Congress or another state, by reference; 
but atte,.lpt to rt~ake future regulations of 
sdiction part of tl1e state lc\1.' is 
held to be an unconstitutional dele-
gislative pouer. 1' 
17 
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Const utional Problems - p. 6 -- #504 
In its impact on a roreign c tion 
both interstate and intrastate commerce 




meas only by a fair proportion of corpora-
orne at~ributable to business done wi 
(In rstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone (1948), 
1613)* The 1aw-as presently-drafted is consistent 
principle (R. & T.C. Sees. 23040, 23151 and 2'101). 
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j since such a tax represents an unconst1-
on interstate cotnmerce {Soector Motor 
,. 0 •Connor ( 1951), 95 L. Ed. 5TI). 
its application to a foreign corporation 
engaged exclusively in intersta~e commerce, the corporation 
income tax imposed by the law (R. & T.C. Sec. 2j50J) must 
be nondiscriminatory and may relate only to pro~er!y 
apportioned net income from activities within California 
(west PublishinQ.' Compan_Y. v. r.1cc~.:_l~ (1946}, 27 Cal. 2d 
705, affd. 90 L. Ed. 1603; Nor t. . .. .= :3 tern States Port L!nd 
Cement Company v. Minnesota, ar.c i.:.lltams v. Stockrd: 
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Constitutional Problema - p. 8 - #504 
carrying back of such a loss to each of the three tJxable 
ye8rs preceding the year in which it occurs, and carrying 
1 t for~-:ard to each of the five years follmling. Insofar as 
this provision might apply so as to cause a reduction in any 
California taxes that may have~previously vested in the 
State, there could be a violation of Section 31 of Article IV 
of the State Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature 
from making gifts of public money for private purpose3 
(see Estate of Stanford v. Widber (1899), 126 Cal. 112; 
and Allen v.~ranchise ~ aoara-(1952), 39 Cal. 2d 109). 
JGjcc 
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BION M. GREGORY 
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September 30, 1980 
Honorable Wadie P. Deddeh 
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Income Tax Laws - #15514 
Dear Mr. Deddeh: 
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DEPUTIES 
Does the Legislature have power, by statute, to 
incorporate federal law by reference into California's 
Personal Income Tax Law? 
OPINION 
The Legislature has power, by statute, to incor-
porate existing federal law by reference into California's 
Personal Income Tax Law. However, the Legislature may not 
incorporate future federal laws into California's income 
tax structure. 
ANALYSIS 
This question raises the possibility of an improper 
delegation of legislative power. 
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The cases hold that the Legislature is vested with 
a generally nondelegable power to make laws for the State of 
California (see, for example, 13 Cal. Jur. 3d, Const. Law, 
Sec. 104, p. 198, et seq.; and Sec. 3, Art. III, Sec. 1, 
Art. IV, Cal. Const.), and the courts have held that the 
Legislature is generally prohibited from providing for the 
automatic incorporation by reference of the future amend-
ments of the laws of any other jurisdiction. As the court 
stated, in Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297: 
" ••• It is, of course, perfectly 
valid to adopt existing statutes, rules or 
regulations of Congress or another state, by 
reference; but the attempt to make future 
regulations of another jurisdiction part of 
the state law is generally held to be an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power." (Emphasis added.) 
In the cases, it was frequently stressed that the 
delegation of legislative power to others would be upheld if 
the discretion of the administrative officers charged with 
administering the laws were controlled and guided by adequate 
rules or standards prescribed therefor (see, for example, 
Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 600). However, more recent 
cases indicate that the need is usually not for "standards" 
but for "safeguards" to protect those affected by adminis-
trative action (Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 381, 382). 
Moreover, whether the incorporation of future 
federal laws-into this state's Personal Income Tax Law would 
involve an invalid delegation of legislative power must be 
determined under the terms of California's Constitution (see 
Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d 401, 412), 
and Californiars-constitution has been under a gradual 
process of revision since 1966 (see Prop. 1-a, Ballot 
Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Tuesday, Nov. 8, 1966). 
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of the task of recommending to the Legislature 
the changes in the Constitution was delegated 
to · Revision Commission, which was created 
pursuant to an Assembly concurrent resolution in 1963 (Res. 
Ch. 1 , Stats. 1963). In its report to the Joint Committee 
on Legislative Organization on February 15 1966, on the 
proposed revision of seven articles of fornia 
Constitution, the commission stated as fol page 24, 
with respect to the delegation of legis 
the proposed new constitutional provisions 
" .•• The word 'provide• used.in 
sense 'The Legislature may provide' ••. 
a power which may be delegated. On 
other hand the word 'prescribe,' used in 
sense that something 'shall be prescribed' 
indicates a power which may not be 
II 
that the courts would give considerable 
meaning accorded to 11 provide" and "prescribe" 
Constitution Revision Commission in construing the 
new provisions of California's Constitution (see Van Arsdale 
v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 249; Isaacson v. City of 
Oakland, 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 421). The constitutions of 
none of those states which presently incorporate current 
and future federal income tax law by reference require the 
Legis of the respective states to "prescribe" income 
tax 
Constitution Revision Commission was terminated, 
March 4, 1974 lJoint Rules Committee Resolution 
No .. 57, 1973-74 Reg. Sess.l, and a new group was formed to 
study the revision of Article XIII of the State Constitution, 
the which deals primarily with tax matters. This 
the "Constitutional Revision Task Force on 
XIII," did not have the same status as the 
Revision Commission, that the task force 
was not created pursuant to resolution or other official 
legis action. However, the report of the task force 
was printed as an Appendix to the Senate Daily for 
May 14, 1974, and in the Assembly Journal , 1974, 
at page 13237, to express n the 
drafters of this revision and of the Legis adopting 
it" (at 13238 of the Assembly Journal). 
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On page 13272 Assembly Journal, the task 
force proposed the following language with respect to 
income taxes in subdivision a new Section 26 of 
Article XIII of the State Constitution: 
11 (a) Taxes on or measured by income 
may be imposed on , corporations 
or other entities as prescribed by law."* 
(Emphasis added.) 
On the same Assembly Journal, the task 
force provided the following comment: 
11 Sections 26 (a) and 26 (b) are intended 
to consolidate existing Section 11 (which 
authorizes the Legislature to impose income 
taxes} with the pertinent portion of existing 
Section 1 3/4 which interest from 
State and bonds income taxes." 
Thus, unlike Constitution Revision Commission, 
the task force did not speak of the distinctions to be drawn 
between "provide" and 11 prescribe." Instead, the task force 
merely stated that i.t was intended to "consolidate"--but 
not necessarily change--an existing constitutional provision. 
The language in subdivision (a) of Section 26, as 
Set forth abOVe 1. WaS Subsequently apprOVed by the VOterS 
without change as a part of Proposition 8 on the ballot for 
the General Election held on November 5, 1974. However, the 
precise meaning of the former constitutional provision on 
income taxes still remains somewhat obscure. 
From the 
in 1879 until its 
the adoption of the Constitution 
74, former Section 11 of Article 
XIII provided as follows 
* 
"SEC. 11.. Income taxes be assessed 
, corporations, to and collected from 
joint-stock associations, 
dent or doing business in 
or companies resi-
this State, or any 
cases and amounts, 
shall be prescribed by 
one or more of them, 
and in such manner, as 
law." (With emphasis being added.) 
The same material in the Appendix to the 
Senate Daily , 1974, which was printed 
as a 
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prov1s1on was not interpreted by the 
whether the Legislature could delegate 
the to impose an income tax. However, we do note that 
constitutional amendments were bvice placed the ballot 
to that purpose and were defeated time 
(Prop. 14, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8 66 Prop. 
4, Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 5, 1968). 
With respect to the provision regarding income 
the convention which convened in Sacramento 
8, 1878, some of the delegates seemed aware of 
rule that the Legislature would have inherent 
an income tax, even without a constitutional 
therefor, while others were not so sure that 
authorization would be unnecessary (see 
~.~.- Proceedinis of the Constitutional Convention of 
State of Californ1a, Vol. II, at pp. 946, 947; see also 
.-r:owery, 25 Cal. 2d 561, 568; and Roth Drug, Inc. 
13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 739, 740, for a discussion 
lature's inherent power to tax). 
The convention did not reach the issue of whether 
a di was intended between "provide" and "prescribe," 
as used in the income tax provision. 
However, cases construing other constitutional 
provis~ns decided prior to the time the Constitutional 
Convention met in 1878 held that "prescribed" indicated a 
nonde legislative power (_see Exline v. Smith, 5 Cal. 
112, 113; see also People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520, 526), 
and generally be presumed that the framers of the 
Constitution intended to use "prescribed" in this restricted 
v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345, 360). 
that the courts will look to other sections 
in which a word is used in order to 
meaning in the section at issue (_Miller v. 
Dunn, • 462, 466}. 
Moreover, after the Constitution of 79 was 
prior to the commencement of the constitutional 
1966, the courts continued to a distinction 
between "provide" and "prescribe" in constitutional provi-
s People v. Johnson, 95 Cal. 471, 474, 5; Slavich 
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California's Personal Income Tax Law. However, since the 
Legislature must "prescribe" this state's income tax laws, 
the Legislature could not incorporate future changes in 
federal statutes. Morever, we think it would be necessary 
to amend the Constitution to implement a program to incor-
porate future federal laws into the Personal Income Tax Law. 
CJW:jm 
Very truly yours, 
Bion M. Gregory 
Legislative Counsel 
~~ .4>L 4 ,W ~-
By v 
Christopher J. Wei 
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In this Report I consider two related questions: Whether 
it would be constitutional for California to adopt a statute 
conforming its income tax's base to the federal tax base in an 
* "open-ended" or "ongoing" way; and whether it would be consti-
tutional for Congress to accept the invitation tendered by 
Congress in the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, as 
amended. One of my conclusions will be that there is a high 
probability that the California Supreme Court would affirm the 
constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute. However, 
as for participation in the federal program, I will conclude that 
strong arguments can be advanced both in favor of and in opposition 
to constitutionality, and that there is no obvious method for 
reliably predicting which set of arguments the California Supreme 
Court would find the more persuasive. 
Most of this Report consists of a long exposition of the 
relevant case law. This exposition aspires to be as straight-
forward and "neutral" as possible, so that the reader can make 
up his own mind as to what the proper legal inferences are. To 
this extent, much of the Report is quite deliberately "dull." 
Part II consists of my own effort to utilize the law exposited 
in Part I in order to analyze the California constitutional 
questions. 
The Report also makes clear that whatever constitutional 
*There is no doubt whatsoever that a California "date of 
enactment" conformity statute would be valid. See pp. 33-38, 
infra. California's constitution does not contain any New York-like 
prohibition against incorporation by reference. See p. 12, infra. 
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could be cured by an 
tion. While 
California in pas 
and a number of states, 
been successful 
authorize open-ended 
A final p 
judgments which 
It should be make 
to which I myse 
legislator, I do not 
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conformity or "piggybacking" 
amendment to the state constitu-
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been reasonably close; 
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constitutions so as to 
reference to certain policy 
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et that these are judgments 
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STANDARDS AND THE 
a lature's 
agency which has been 
s engages in 
that delegation 
Constitution, vesting 
s i e When a state 
correlate question 
legation under the state 
trines are 
ss can delegate 
meaningful standards 
agency decisionmaking. 
9 (1928). In fact, 
Supreme Court has found 
even though the standards 
ous. 
le," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v, · 
convenience, interest, 
methods of competition," 
1 (1920), have been held 
standard. Given this 
can fairly enough argue 
that Congressional delegations to federal agencies are valid 
even in the absence of a clearly "intelligible" standard., See 
K. Davis, 1 Administrativ.e Law Treatise 177 (2d ed. 1978). 
Indeed, in all of American constitutional history, there are 
only two Supreme Court cases, both of them decided i~ the judicially 
aggressive year of 1935, which have found particular delegations to 
federal agencies to be beyond Congress's power. Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), invalidated provisions 
of a New Deal measure authorizing the President to prohibit the 
shipment of "hot oil" in interstate cormnerce. In fact, the legis-
lation in question did contain standards for Presidential decision-
making the "intelligibility" of which seems clearly sufficient 
in light of both earlier and later Supreme Court decisions. For 
this reason, the Panama holding is presently understood either as 
no longer stating good law or as being severely limited to its 
particular facts. See K. Davis, supra, at 175. 
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
invalidated key provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
which had delegated to a new federal agency the authority to establish 
comprehensive codes of conduct governing all businesses subject 
to Congress's commerce clause powers. Especially since the 
Schecter Court was unanimous, the Court's holding must be taken 
somewhat seriously. In truth, the standards set forth in the Act 
(like the standards in Panama) seem to pass constitutional muster. 
What was distinctive about the Schecter delegation--and what thus dis-
tinguishes the Schecter case from other delegation cases--is the 
extensiveness or "scopett of the legislature's delegation. See 
K. Davis, supra, at 176. The federal agency was being given 
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sw~eping powers to regulate wide-ranging aspects of the 
interstate economy. At least in this sense the statute did indeed 
involve "delegation running riot," 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., 
concurring). Insofar as Schecter has not been overruled, it 
implicitly stands for the federal principle that the "scope" of 
the delegation is a variable to be taken into account in ruling on 
the delegation's constitutionality. 
\~at about state constitutional doctrines on delegation? 
One scholar has observed that the anti-delegation rule possesses 
far more vitality within state constitutional law than it does at 
the federal level. SeeK. Davis, supra, at 204. This observation 
does not really apply to California, however. Prior to 1939, 
California courts frequently enough intervened to invalidate 
state legislature '·s delegations to state administrative agencies. 
See, e.g., People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624 (1881). But leading 
California Supreme Court opinions in 1939 and 1940 not only 
liberalized California delegation law, but set the stage for 
and more drastic liberalizations. Jersey Maid Uilk Products Co. v. 
Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939), affirmed a state 
statute conferring on the state Director of Agriculture the 
to designate marketing areas for the milk industry and to es 
"stabilization and marketing plans" in local areas. And 
Parker affirmed, against delegation challenge, additional aspects 
of state's anti-Depression agricultural legislation. 15 Cal. 2d 
275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940). So far as I know, in the years since 
Jersey Maid and Ray·not a single California statute delegating powers 
to an administrative agency has been held unconstitutional on 
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an insufficiency in the standards guiding the delegation. (But see 
• 
Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. , 11 Cal. 
d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).) Illustrative of 
cases finding particular delegations permissible are Sunset 
Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 496 P.2d 
840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972); City and County of San Francisco 
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347 P.2d 294, 1 Cal. Rptr. 158 
59); and Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 544, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
443, hearing· denied (1970). As for the meaninglessness of the 
ostensible requirement that the Legislature set forth standards 
that provide meaningful guidance, consider Holloway v. Purcell, 
35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665 (1950), in which the Court rejected 
a challenge to a state statute delegating to the Highway Commission 
authority to determine the location of highways running between 
termini designated by the Legislature. The only standard which 
the statute evidently set forth as to highway location was that 
Commission make use of "such terms ancl conditions as in [the 
Commission's] opinion will best subserve the public interest." 
cannot imagine a "standard" more vacuous than "public interest". 
Surely an agency would never be given legislative instructions 
to ignore or subvert the public interest; and obviously 
the "public interest" goal is wholly nonoperational in the "guidance" 
it 5s capable of giving. Yet the Supreme Court, in a bland opinion 
auLhored by Justice Traynor, indicated that "public interest" 
provided a "sufficiently definite primary standard" which an admin-
istrative agency could be asked by the Legislature to "specifically 
apply." (For a comparable U.S. Supreme Court holding, see Avent v. 
United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).) 
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The effective bankruptcy of the "sufficient standard" aspect 
of California's trad~tional rule on the legality of delegations 
has been explicitly recognized in the California Supreme Court in 




B. DELEGATION BY CONGRESS OF FEDERAL LAWMAKING AUTHORITY TO THE 
STATES: THE RELEVANCE OF CONFORMITY AS A JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLE 
In one dramatic situation, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded 
the federal interest in conformity between federal and state 
law can constitutionally justify a substantial delegation of 
federal lawmaking authority to the states. Under 18 U.S.C. § 13, 
any act committed on a federal territory which would violate a 
statute of the state in which the territory lies is ipso 
facto a criminal offense against the United States. Section 13 
(which was enacted in 1948) thus "assimilates" even criminal 
statutes of a state which may be enacted by the state subsequent 
to 1948. In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.;S. 286 (1958), a 
defendant was prosecuted in 1955 for certain sexual conduct on a 
federal air force base in Texas which was contrary to a Texas 
penal statute that had been enacted in 1950. The issue the United 
States Supreme Court addressed was whether § 13 "is constitutional 
insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently 
enacted criminal law of the state in which the enclave is situated.' 
Id. at 286. By a 7~2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of constitu-
tionality. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Douglas 
and concurred in by Justice Black, highlights the difficulty of 
the delegation issue. The Douglas dissent begins by recognizing 
Congress's Article I authority to regulate federal enclaves. Justice 
Douglas then reasoned that this authority 
call[s] for the exercise of legislative judgment; 
and I do not see how that requirement can be 
satisfied by delegating the authority to the 
President, the Department of the Interior, or, as 
in this case, to the states. . . . Congress can 
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adopt as federal laws the [existing] laws of a 
state ... Congress can, I think, adopt as 
federal law, governing an enclave, the state law 
governing speeding as it may from time to time 
be enacted. The Congress there determines what 
the basic policy is. Leaving the details to be 
filled in by a state is analogous to the scheme 
of delegated implementation of congressionally 
adopted policies with which v7e are familiar in 
the field of administrative law. But it is 
Congress that must determine the policy for that 
is the essence of lawmaking. Under the scheme 
now approved a State makes such federal law, 
applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that 
law becomes federal law, for the violation of 
which a citizen is sent to prison. . . . Here 
it is a sex crime on which Congress has never 
legislated. Tomorrow it may be a blue law, a 
law governing usury, or even a law requiring 
segregation of the races on buses and in 
restaurants. . [An accused] is entitled to 
the considered judgment of Congress whether the 
law applied to him fits the federal policy. That 
7 
is what federal lawmaking is. . . . There is some 
convenience in doing what the Court allows today ... 
But convenience is not material to the constitutional 
problem. 
Id. at 297-99. 
The opinion for the Court majority began by describing the 
legislative precursors of § 13. Earlier federal statutes had 
adopted as federal law for enclave purposes only those state 
statutes in effect at the time of the particular federal enactment. 
But since Congress was conn:n.itted to the goal of achieving "conformity1 
between federal enclave law and state law, Congress was required 
to reenact this "assimilation" statute in 1866, 1874, 1895, 1909, 
1933, 1935, and 1944. It was against the background of this 
experience that Congress in its 1948 legislation attempted to 
incorporate or assimilate even those state statutes enacted sub-
sequent to 1948. 
The Court's reasoning made clear the laudability of the 
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policy of "conformity" which Congress had been pursuing. It recog-
nizkd that "having the power to assimilate the state law, Congress 
obviously has like power to renew such assimilation annually or 
daily in order to keep the law in the enclaves current with those 
in the states." Id. at 293-94. Noting Congress's "123 years 
of experience with the policy of conformi·ty," the Court then 
concluded that 
Congress is within its constitutional powers and 
legislative discretion when . . . it enacts that 
[conformity] policy in its most complete and 
accurate form. Rather than being a delegation 
by Congress of its legislative authority to the 
states, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by 
Congress for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted 
offenses and punishments as shall have already been 
put in effect by the respective states for their 
own government. Congress retains power to exclude 
a particular state law from the assimilative effect 
of the Act. This procedure is a practical accommoda-
tion of the mechanics of the legislative functions of 
state and nation in the field of police power where 
it is especially appropriate to make the federal 
regulation of local conduct conform to that already 
established by the state. 
Id. at 294. The Court then referred to several other 
federal statutes which in one way or another gave federal effect 
to whatever state criminal rules were in effect at the state level 
at the time of the statute's enactment. 
A number of post-Sharpnack lower federal court opinions 
reveal the variety of ways in which the Sharpnack holding can 
authorize a seeming delegation of federal lawmaking authority to 
the states. Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1966), 
involved a personal injury which occurred in a federal post 
office. 40 U.S.C. § 90 stipulates that a state's workers' compen-
sation law applies to injuries within a federal building situated 
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within that state. In Wallach the personal injury victim--who 
wi.shed to sue his employer in tort rather than merely claiming 
under workers' compensation--argued that the federal statute, 
insofar as it incorporated the state's workers' compensation law, 
entailed an unconstitutional delegation to the state. The Second 
Circuit, relying on Sharpnack and noting the propriety of Congress's 
policy of seeking conformity between federal and state law on all 
federal properties, rejected this challenge. 
United States v. Smeldome, 485 F.2d 1333 (lOth Cir. 1973), 
affirmed 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which provides a federal penalty for 
anybody managing or owning "an illegal gambling business"; such a 
business is in turn defined as a gambling business employing a 
minimum number of people, in business for a minimum number of 
days, and in "violation of the law of a state or political sub-
division in which it is conducted . . " Smeldome involved a 
sports betting operation taking place in Colorado in seeming 
violation of a Colorado gambling statute. The defendant argued 
that § 1955 was unconstitutional insofar as it delegated federal 
lawmaking authority to the states. The Tenth Circuit, relying on 
Sharpnack, rejected this challenge, ruling that "[i]t is well 
settled in the law that Congress may adopt as federal laws the 
laws of a state, and such is not an unconstitutional delegation 
of congressional authority." Id. at 1345. In United States v. 
Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Colo. 1970), a district court also 
relied on a simple statement of the Sharpnack rule in affirming 
the constitutionality of§ 892(B)(l) of the Federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Act, providing that if a particular extension 
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of credit is unenforceable under state law, this is "prima 
facie evidence" that the credit extension is "extortionate" 
and therefore in violation of federal law. Smeldome and Curcio 
suggest that the lower courts are giving the Sharpnack rule a 
rather broad interpretation, allowing it to be applied even when 
there has not been a convincing showing as to the federal need 
for or interest in conformity. However, in neither Smeldome nor 
Curcio did the relevant state statute in fact postdate the federal 
statute; and only in postdating situations is the problem of an 
open-ended delegation explicitly and dramatically presented. 
I should make clear that federal rules of the Sharpnack sort 
deal only with the proper interpretation of the provisions in 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, conferring lawmaking powers on 
Congress; the Sharpnack rule thus does not directly "apply" to 
California. However, both the status of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the quality of its reasoning in Sharpnack suggest that the 
Sharpnack rule would probably be treated by California courts as an 
influential oui-of~state precedent. 
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C. NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING 
AUTHORITY TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A "SOFT" PROHIBITING RULE 
In reading judicial opinions, one can easily enough identify 
a "general rule" to the effect that state legislatures may r:ot 
delegate lawmaking authority to the federal government (call this 
"the Rule"). (See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941), annotating 
Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940), a case which 
e does clearly apply the Rule to a state statute professing to 
require labeling of local fruit according to federal standards.) 
The more one reads these opinions, however, the less solid one 
understands the Rule to be. Many of the cases--including most 
of the recent cases--deal with tax conformity statutes. While 
these cases will be treated separately in the next section, it 
suffices here to say that several of them reach an affirmative 
result on the constitutional question, and that the single opinion 
squarely invalidating a tax conformity statute comes from a juris-
diction whose constitution contains special language. 
In recent years, many of the references to the Rule have come in 
sheer dicta. See e.g., State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d 
259, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973); 
State ex rel. Kirschner v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261, 
265 (1957); Calvert v. Capital Southwest Corp, 441 S.W.2d 247, 264 
(Tax Ct. Civ. App. 1969); State v. Dumler, 221 Kan. 386, 391, 559 
P.2d 798, 803 (1977). For a case that blends apparent dictum with 
a very limited holding applying th~ Rule, see State v. Williams, 
119 Ariz. 595, 583 P.2d 251 (1978). 
In the non-tax context, a number of the opinions announcing 
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the Rule likewise turn out to contain peculiar features. In 1935 
the New York Court of Appeals, divided 4-3, held unconstitutional 
a state statute which applied to the intrastate coal industry 
whatever codes were developed for interstate coal by the federal 
National Recovery Administration. Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y.290, 
196 N.E.61 (1935). The majority chiefly relied, however, on a 
particular provision in the New York state Constitution prohibiting 
the incorporation by reference even of "any existing law"; the 
purpose of this special provision, the majority indicated, is to 
prevent the New York legislature from misunderstanding laws that 
it otherwise might vote to pass. (For another New York holding 
resting on this special constitutional prohibition, see People v. 
Mazzie, 78 Misc. 2d 1014, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1974).) In Relegate 
Bros. Co. v. Bayshore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A.672 (1938), a unanimous 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a state statute incorporating 
into Pennsylvania law whatever minimum hours might be fixed by 
future federal NRA regulations for certain industries. The Pennsyl-
vania Court was concerned not just with the Rule, however, but also 
-
with the inequalities which the statute's delegation would produce 
as among different classes of Pennsylvania employers. 
In recent years, the largest number of cases dealing with the 
Rule have concerned state statutes rendering it a state offense for 
individuals to possess, without prescription, drugs that have been 
given certain designations by the federal Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, exercising authority conferred on him/her by 
Congressional statutes. When these state laws were enacted, most 
of the relevant federal statutes were already in place; the federal 
49 
13 
Secretary had made some designations, but others were to be made 
' by him in the future. The Supreme Courts of Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Georgia, and Michigan have all interpreted their states' statutes 
as applying only to federal law and designations already in effect 
when the state statutes were enacted. State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 
183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972); 
People v. Urban, 45 Mich. App. 255, 206 N.W.2d 511 (1973); Johnston 
v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 181 S.E.2d 42 (1971). While all of these 
interpretations were motivated by a desire to avoid a constitutional 
ruling, only the Michigan opinion stated flat-out that the state 
statute, if not so interpreted, would be unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota and Washington, finding 
their statutes indeed open-ended, ruled them unconstitutional. 
These Courts were only partly concerned with the question of dele-
gation, however. Their opinions chiefly \vorry about the problem 
of due process or "fair notice." As the South Dakota Court 
1 described the situation: 
The list of hallucinogenic drugs was constantly 
changing ~nd at any given time it would be 
necessary to consult the regulations of the 
Secretary to determine whether or not a certain 
drug came within the prohibition of the state 
statute. 
State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 558, 173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (1970). 
According to the Washington Court, "it is unreasonable to expect 
an average person to continually research the Federal Register 
to determine which drugs are controlled substances." State v. 
Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 570 Pac. 2d 135, 138 (1977). 
Over the years, Michigan courts have been especially interested 
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in the Rule. In Lievense v. Michigan Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 
335 Mich. 339, 55 N.W.2d 857 (1952), the Court considered a state 
statute imposing certain burdens on each employer who "is liable 
for any federal tax" under the federal unemployment compensation 
program. The Court indicated that if the statute applied to 
prospective federal rulings on employer liability, the Michigan Act 
would be unconstitutional on account of the Rule. It therefore 
interpreted the "is liable" clause to refer only to liability 
existing under federal law at the time the Michigan statute was 
itself enacted. In Dearborn Independent, Inc., v. City of Dearborn, 
331 Mich. 447, 49 N.W.2d 370 (1951), the Court considered a state 
statute requiring that all "official publications" of Michigan 
cities be published only in newspapers "which shall have been 
admitted by the United States Post Office Department for trans-
mission as mail matter of the second class." The Court, though 
badly divided on another issue, unanimously ruled that the statute 
unconstitutionally violated the Rule. However, even in Michigan 
the Rule is less than absolute. In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 
-
17 N.W.2d 193 (1945-). a divided Supreme Court upheld a Detroit 
ordinance attaching a local penalty to any violation within Detroit 
of wartime federal price control rules. The Court relied both on 
the emergency created by wartime inflation and on the fact that 
the ordinance 
did not create new regulations and prohibitions 
but merely added the city's enforcement sanction 
to Federal laws and regulations which were 
already applicable to the city and its inhabitants 
during the emergency. 














t such offenses, the laws of the United States of 
State , or another state." In People v. 
Colo. 5 P.2d 952 (1979), the Colorado Supreme 
aw t to statute. Court agreed that "only 
s has the power to define crimes in 
,"and that "a Assembly cannot be 
to any branch a no tate's government or to the 
But the Court s as essment was that the General Assembly 
done an j of defining 'the crime here charged." 
to Court, embly's intent, properly appreciated, 
was merely to a category of prior 
crimes whose general nature, in the General 
Assembly's judgment, was so serious that their 
perpetrators could not safely be allowed to 
possess weapons in Colorado. 
P.2d at 954-55. 
above review of case law can be easily summarized. 
non-California decis , delegations of lawmaking authority 
states to the federal government do seem somewhat disfavored. 
the case law is shaggy, full of qualifications, and lacking 
underlying basic explanation. It is very doubtful that the 
Supreme Court--or indeed any California court--would 
any significant weight to this unimpressive collection of opin~ 
If anything, the cases strongly suggest that it is necessary to 
ider a particular delegation in the context of the state statute 
which it is found; that is, the purpose of the particular statute 
well bear on the acceptability of the delegation. If this is 
, then it makes speci sense to bring together those cases 
with the proprie of state tax statutes conforming the 
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state's income tax base with federal income tax standards. Those 
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has been assumed valid. See Cordes, The Kansas 
Income t: Part I, 17 U. Kan. L. Rev. 147, 149 
( 68 . Under a 59 amendment to the New York state Constitu-
New York 
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lature, in imposing any income tax, 
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" A New York court has 
of the state's constitutional 
ended conformity enactment, 
, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (1966). A 
constitution provides that "[w]hen 
Legislature, the Legislature may 
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amendment came into effect, the 
ts powers by enacting a state 
federal statutes, rules, 
be or become effective, at any 
taxpayer year." In Anderson v. 
322 (1967), the constitutionality 
the Nebraska Supreme Court. In 
indicated that absent the constitu-
7 
entail an unconstitutional 
of constitutionality would 
titution of the state and since 
's Constitution in this respect, 
resulted in no constitutional 
21 
violation. But the Anderson taxpayer then asserted an ingenious 
• 
fallback position: that the Nebraska statute's delegation 
violated the "republican form of government" guarantee set forth 
in the enabling legislation admitting Nebraska to the United 
States, While regarding this as a "case of first impression," 
the Court concluded that the state statute was not lacking in 
republicanness, since the statute "does not constitute a waiver 
of the sovereignty of the state nor an abdication of its functions." 
The Court~s reasoning on this point weakens the force of its 
delegation dictum. 
2, In the Absence of Specific Constitutional Amendment 
Only one state court has actually invalidated a state 
conformity statute on constitutional delegation grounds. A 
Minnesota statute provided that individual gross income for state 
income tax purposes "means the adjusted gross income as computed 
for federal tax purposes as defined in the laws of the United 
States for the taxable year, with the modifications specified in 
this Section." A federal law promulgated subsequent to this statute's 
amendment-permitted the exclusion from income of sick pay which an 
employee might receive, an exclusion which would not have been 
otherwise allowed by Minnesota law. In invalidating the 
Minnesota conformity statute, the Minnesota Court discussed 
general delegation doctrine. Federal adjusted gross income, it 
argued, is 
an artificial concept created solely by Federal 
statute. . . . The amounts which are to be 
included or excluded in the determination are 
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reference thereto, the adoption takes the 
statute as it exists at the time. 
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170 Ga. at 394, 3 S.E. at 70. Having interpreted the statute 
this way, the Court concluded that the del objec 
without merit." The Court's opinion is not clear as to 
the precise "merit" of the objection would been had the 
statute explicitly provided for continuing ty. 
Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 ( 69), dealt 
the Illinois income tax conformity statute, passed in 1969. 
The statute provided that Illinois net income "is computed for 
individuals by taking the adjusted gross income from the federal 
income tax return," with certain adjustments, deductions and 
exemptions provided for in the state statute. Also, § 102, the 
"construction" section of the state statute, specified that 
any term used in this Act shall have the same 
meaning as when used in a comparable context 
in the United States Income Tax Revenue Code of 
1954 and other provisions of the statutes of the 
United States relating to federal income taxes 
as such Code and statutes are in effect on the 
.date of enactment of this Act. 
In considering the delegation challenge to the Illinois Act, the 
Court focused on § 102; noting that § 102 limited itself to 
federal law "in effect at the date of enactment" of the Illinois 
Act, the Court found this section entirely cons tutional as an 
incorporation-by-reference. But the Court also noted that "there 
is some scholarly opinion, as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions, that the legislature could adopt a statute providing 
that future modifications of the Code would have consequences in 
the meaning and application of the Act." 43 Ill. 2d. at 49, 
250 A.2d at 640. It is unclear whether the t's "date of 
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enactment" for § 102 carries over to the statute's 
re to federal adjusted gross income. The 
seems to assume that it does; but latter provision's 
t re to taxpayer's ac "federal income tax 
re an interpretation difficult. 
advantages of interpreting statutes to 
questions, the interpretations in 
seem guided. As for 
in the paragraph above. In Santee Mills 
the third" provision of the state statute 
seems tent with a ruling that would not allow the taxpayer 
simply to consult his federal tax return for the particular year 
making his one-third calculation. (Compare the Ninth Circuit's 
in Mullaney.) For practical reasons of this sort, it 
be that the "date of enactment" holding in Featherstone has 
since ignored in Georgia. See Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App. 
552, 556, 6 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1939), in which the Court, in 
quoting from Featherstone, interestingly edits out its "date of 
enactment" language, and then describes the Georgia tax assessment 
process as follows: 
The State Revenue Commission, in assessing the 
tax against McKenney, merely adopted the Federal 
method of calculating his net income under the 
Federal statute as the State's method of 
accomplishing that result, and properly assessed 
the tax due to the State as one-third of the 
amount which he had paid to the United States. 
Such adoption was not a delegation to the Federal 







LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING AUTHORITY 
GOVERNMENT: A THIN BUT NOT UNINTERESTING RECORD 
the issue of the legality of delegations from the state 
to federal government, negative language can be 
two early California Supreme Court decisions. In the 
is a state Court of Appeal holding which 
legation. In the 1940's, the Supreme Court again used 
a delegation; but a 1960's Supreme Court 
gave emphatic application to a delegating statute without 
licitly discussing the constitutional question. There is also 
s tance tax statutory precedent. 
1. Of the two early Supreme Court opinions, the first is 
In the Matter of Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 P. 193 (1923). Subsequent 
to Congress's enactment of the Volstead Act on prohibition, California 
voters approved by referendum the Wright Act, which professed to incor-
porate law all of the pertinent penal provisions of 
tead Act. In Burke, the California Supreme Court's chief 
was that nothing in the California constitution prohibited 
amounted to an incorporation-by-reference. The particular 
ass was made that the Wright Act was invalid on grounds 
ssed to include into California law any amendments to 
which Congress might enact in the future. The 
to this assertion by saying: 
It may be conceded that this provision [of the Wright 
Act] is not valid, although we do not decide it, since 
it is not involved. The only effect of putting that 
provis into the statute would be, at most, tpat the 
provision itself would be void, leaving the remainder 
of the Act valid. It is not such a component part 
of the Act itself as would be necessary to require us to 
that invalidated the entire Act. 
. at 3 P. at 194. 71 
was 
law. The 
tions of ano 
matter 
held to be an uncons 
As documentation, 
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and nation are attempting to rehabilitate the 
interchange of produce. . . . The incidental 
objection that the delegation of code prescription 
to the President of the United States on the ground 
that the state of California is a sovereign state 
and the President is in this state a foreign offi-
cial does not greatly impress us. The correlative 
rights of state and nation are of great importance, 
but we are a nation not an alliance of foreign 
states, and our President is not a foreign poten-
tate. . . . If ever there could occur a state of 
facts justifying, even demanding, co-operative 
effort between the state and the nation, as pro-
vided for in the law under consideration here, we 
have it in the principle underlying this case. The 
disease is but one and the patient is but one; how 
logical that the curative agents must not conflict. 
Only confusion could result if one code were fixed for 
produce entering interstate commerce and another code 
for produce entering intrastate commerce. 
1 Cal. App. 2d. at 203-04, 36 P.2d at 687. Lasswell thus sets 
forth a dramatic holding to the effect that state delegation to 
federal authorities can be constitutionally justified by the 
need for state-federal collaboration in dealing with a particular 
societal problem. In this regard, Lasswell is commended in Mermin, 
"Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation 
Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 
57 Yale L.J. 1, 12-13 (1942). 
The "authority" of the Lasswell holding should not be over-
stated, however. Lasswell is, of course, only a Court of Appeal 
opinion. Moreover, the Lasswell opinion is weakened by its failure 
to allude to the Supreme Court's previous discussion of the delega-
tion issue in Burke. And other aspects of the Lasswell opinion 
suggest that the LasswellCourt may have insufficiently appreciated 
the integrity of the non-delegation doctrine. In another of its 
holdings, the Lasswell Court approved the statute's massive dele-
delegation of authority to an administrative agency. Yet the 
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federal counterpart of this state delegation was held unconsti-
tutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schecter. 
3. The 1940's Supreme Court opinion is Palermo v. Stockton 
Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948). California's 
Alien Land Law of 1920 and 1923 prohibited aliens not qualifying 
for U.S. citizenship from owning or leasing land in California--
unless the aliens' rights in these respects were protected by 
treaty. A 1911 treaty between this country and Japan entitling 
Japanese to own or lease land in the United States worked to trigger 
the Land Law's treaty proviso. Particular Japanese nationals leased 
land in California in 1935 for a 10-year period. In 1940, the 1911 
treaty was abrogated by the United States, and the owners of the 
land sought to void the lease. A Court of Appeal ruled that the 
Alien Land Law referred to treaties only as they existed in 1920 
and 1923; hence the repeal of the treaty in 1940 did not deprive 
the Japanese nationals of their property rights. In reaching this 
holding, the Court indicated--citing Brock and Burke--that there 
is "grave doubt whether our legislature could constitutionally 
delegate to the tr~aty-making authority of the United States" the 
power to determine California law "with respect to future acts." 
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of 
Appeal's holding, adopted all of that Court's opinion, including 
this delegation passage. 32 Cal. 2d at 60, 195 P.2d at 5. 
But it is clear from the paragraphs which the Supreme Court added 
(as a supplement) to the Court of Appeal opinion that the Supreme 
Court had an even stronger reason for giving the Alien Land Law 
a narrow interpretation. Unless that Law was construed as compat-
ible with the particular lease, the Supreme Court would have been 
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required to launch a full enquiry into the constitutionality of 
the Alien Land Law itself, insofar as it discriminated against 
aliens. It was chiefly to avoid this constitutional dispute that 
the Court subscribed to the "static" interpretation of the Land 
Law recommended by the Court of Appeal. (That Court's opinion, 
it can be added, relied on the precedent of the federal Assimila-
tive Crimes Act concerning federal enclaves, an Act which at the 
time the opinion was released applied only to state criminal laws 
in effect at the time the Act had been (re)enacted. But as we 
know, in 1948 Congress amended the Act to render its delegation 
open-ended in character--and this amendment was later endorsed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sharpnack. Presently, therefore, 
the federal precedent works to dispel the "doubt" to which the 
Palermo language refers.) 
76 
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4. The 1960's case is Eden Hemorial Park Ass'n v. Department 
of Publi"c Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790 
(1963), in which the California Supreme Court willingly applied a 
state statute which effectively delegated lawmaking powers to the 
federal government; however, in effectin~ this application, the 
Court did not explicitly discuss the statute's constitutionality. 
Federal grant-in-aid programs frequently raise problems as 
to the relationship between the powers of state and local govern-
ments under state law and the requirements set forth by federal 
law for participation in the federal programs. Recognizing the 
potential for problems of this sort in the federal-aid highway 
program in the 1930's, the Ca~ifornia Legislature enacted a 
statute which, as amended, now appears as § 820 of the State and 
Highway Code. 
State Assent to Federal Statutes, Rules and 
Regulations. 
The State of California assents to the provisions 
of Title 23, United States Code, as amended 
and supplemented [and] other Acts of Congress 
relative to federal aid. . . . All work done 
under the provisions of Title 23 or said other 
Acts of Congress relative to highways shall be 
performed as required under Acts of Congress 
and the rules and regulations promulgated there-
under. Laws, rules, or regulations of this state 
inconsistent with such laws, or rules and regula-
tions of the United States, shall not apply to 
such work, to the extent of such inconsistency. 
For delegation purposes, § 820 is a very strong statute. 




policies which may come into conflict with a federal highway 
• program regulation, whenever that regulation is itself promulgated. 
As it happens, I am advi~ed that conflicts of this sort have been 
infrequent. But in the interesting Eden Park case, § 820 turned 
out to be decisive. Under the California Health and Safety Code 
(§ 8560, 8560.5), state and local agencies are forbidden from 
exercising eminent domain powers against cemetery property for 
purposes of constructing any street or highway. Yet in 1960, 
both federal and state highway officials determined that a 
cemetery area near Los Angeles was the best location for a freeway 
which was to be part of the federal Interstate System. Section 107 
of Title 23 of the United States Code reads as follows: 
(a) In any case in which the Secretary is 
requested by a State to acquire lands or 
interests in lands . . . required by such 
State for right-of-way or other purposes in 
connection with the prosecution of any project 
for the construction . . . of any section of 
the Interstate System, the Secretary is 
authorized, in the name of the United 
States ... to acquire, enter into, and take 
possession of such lands or interests in lands 
by purchase, donation, condemnation, or other-
wise-in accordance with the laws of the United 
States . . . if 
(1) the Secretary has determined either that 
the State is unable to acquire necessary lands 
or interest in lands, or is unable to acquire 
such lands or interest in lands with sufficient 
promptness; and 
(2) the State has agreed with the Secretary to 
pay, at such time as may be specified by the 
Secretary an amount equal to ten percent of 
the costs incurred by the Secretary, in acquiring 
such lands . . . 
(c) The Secretary is further authorized a..'""l.d 
directed by proper deed . . . to convey any 
lands or interest in lands acquired in any 
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State under the prov~s~ons of this statute . . 
to the State highway department of such State 
or such political subdivision as its laws may 
provide . . . . 
In 1960 the California Highway Commission attempted to 
condemn the Eden Park property. But a state Court, relying on 
41 
the statutes referred to above, enjoined this state condemnation 
effort. The State Highway Engineer then "requested" the 
federal government to condemn the property on its own pursuant 
to § 107. Under that section, the Secretary of Commerce proceeded 
to condemn the land through federal proceedings and to deed it 
back to the state. But state highway officials were then sued 
in state court to enjoin them from constructing the freeway 
through the cemetery property. 
In its opinion the California Supreme Court first affirmed 
the constitutionality of the federal§ 107, concluding that it 
"seeks a reasonable balance between local and national needs with 
respect to the interstate system,." and that it "does protect local 
interests by requiring that the state request any action by the 
Secretary pursuant to its terms." 59 Cal. 2d at 418, 380 P.2d at 
394, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794. But at this point the Court was 
required to consider a second challenge: that given the state's 
own cemetery statutes, the State Highway Engineer had no authority 
under state law to'~equese'federal action which would result in 
a circumvention of.those statutes. The Supreme Court seemingly 
agreed that the statutes could be interpreted as forbidding the 
Engineer from making this request. But the Court then concluded 
that this implied prohibition was itself overridden by § 820. 
That is, since § 820 intended to "abrogate inconsistent state 
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laws" for purposes of "planning and constructing federally 
assisted state highways," § 820 superseded the state law 
prohibition which would otherwise prevent the State Highway 
Engineer from requesting federal intervention. 59 Cal. 2d at 
419, 380 P.2d at 394-95, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95. 
That the state-law provision which § 820 was allowed to 
override was no more than "implicit" in character weakens the 
42 
drama of Eden Park; and I should note again that the Court, in 
applying § 820, did not explicitly consider its constitutionality. 
Nevertheless, the Eden Park opinion surely suggests the Supreme 
Court's sympathy with the California Legislature's conclusion 
that the maintenance of state prerogatives (as expressed in 
existing state laws and regulations) can properly be subordinated 
to the need to comply with federal norms in order to secure 
certain benefits available from federal sources. 
It is noteworthy, by the way, that § 820 contains a useful 
procedural mechanism. 
Any major conflicts between the laws, rules, 
or reguYations of this state and any such 
federal law, rules, and regulations which 
have been resolved under this Section during 
a calendar year shall be described in a 
report which the department shall submit to 
the Legislature no later than January 30 of 
the succeeding California year. 
With this information collected in the annual report, the Legislature 
is in a position intelligently to consider how well the § 820 process 
of collaboration is working, and to modify or create exceptions in 
that section to the extent that the results it produces seem 
unsatisfactory. 80 
5. Another statutory "precedent" on California-to-federal 
delegation can be found in the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
California's basic inheritance tax is described and imposed in 
43 
that Code's §§ 13401-13411. Sections 13441-13443 provide for an 
"additional tax." According to § 13441: 
In the event that a Federal Estate Tax is 
payable to the United States in a case 
where the inheritance tax payable to this 
state is less than the maximum state tax 
credit allowed by the Federal State Tax 
law, a tax equal to the difference between 
the maximum credit and the inheritance tax 
payable is hereby imposed. 
Section 13442 carries the logic of § 13441 to its logical extreme: 
If no inheritance tax is payable to the state 
in a case where a federal estate tax is payable 
to the United States, a tax equal to the maximum 
state tax credit allowed by the Federal Estate 
Tax law is hereby imposed. 
These provis~ons, which date back to 1943, have been explained 
as follows (in R. Bock, 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes, at 359): 
The -estate tax (sometimes called "pickup tax") is 
imposed in order to obtain for the state the 
maximum benefit from the federal credit for state 
inheritance tax. . . . The state thus collects a 
tax which would otherwise go to the federal government, 
and the total combined state and federal tax is not 
increased, since the additional state tax is offset 
by the additional credit against the federal tax. 
It is clear from the logic and purpose of these provisions that 
the delegation it provides for is of an "ongoing" sort. Though 
the provisions have been part of California law since 1943, they 
have never been judicially challenged on grounds that they entail 
an impermissible delegation. Of course, the provisions are in a 
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way rendered invulnerable by the nature of their operation: 
• they do not subject any California estate to even a penny of 
additional aggregate taxation. (For that matter, they do not 
result in any California estate paying even a penny less in 
aggregate taxation.) Under §§ 13441-43, the basic "winner" is 
the state of California, which receives higher tax revenues than 
it otherwise would receive; the basic "loser" is the federal 
treasury, which can receive somewhat less revenue from an 
individual estate than it otherwise would receive. And federal 
lawmaking authorities have made no effort to contest the state 
strategy which the California provisions manifest. 
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F. CALIFORNIA LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF LAWMAKING AUTHORITY 
FROM ONE JURISDICTION TO ANOTHER: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF KUGLER 
People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 C. 3d 4f?O, 
487 P.2d 1 3, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971), dealt with the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, to which the California Legislature had 
delegated powers to comprehensively regulate land use the Lake 
Tahoe basin. In considering the constitutionality of the delegation, 




legislation were sufficient to provide guidance to 
in carrying out its land use responsibilities. For 
es, what is interesting about the Agency is that 
it a bi-state ent~ty authorized by a Congressional interstate 
compact. The Agency's board consists of ten members, five chosen 
by California officials, but the other five by Nevada officials. 
In approving the Cal~fornia Legislature's delegation, the Court 
did not advert to the fact that a full half of the Agency's 
governors were representatives of another jurisdiction. But 
especially insofar as El Dorado can be regarded in·_.the;eemtext. · · · 
of·Kugier v. Yoeum. (see below), implicit in the silence of the 
El opinion is the following three-step logic: An interstate 
endeavor is an appropriate way--if not the only way--for dealing 
with the problem at hand; bi-state membership is essential to 
such an 
solved 
tate undertaking; the nature of the problem to be 
justifies California's extra-jurisdictional delegation. 
A related point focuses on reciprocity. In return for California's 
in 
California lawmaking powers on Nevada officials, the 
has agreed to lodge Nevada lawmaking authority 




which the mutuality of the problem warrants a mutual solution, 
with the whole of the Agency's effective powers being greater 
than the sum of its California and Nevada parts. 
Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
687 (1968), contains the most recent discussion by the California 
Supreme Court on the specific subject of inter-jurisdictional 
delegations. Indeed, given its reasoning, Kugler stands as the 
most important case in California law on the general question of 
legislative delegations of all sorts. Kugler dealt with a City 
* of Alhambra ordinance which provided that in all future years 
Alhambra firemen should be paid salaries comparable to firemen 
salaries in the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. 
In understanding the reasoning of the Kugler majority, it is 
useful to begin with the position taken by the Kugler dissent. 
Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, would have found 
an invalid delegation, insofar as the ordinance 
would strip from Alhambra's city council its 
discretion to determine one end of the wage 
scale (the minimum), and delegate that discretion 
to the governing bodies of two outside public 
agencies which are entirely without responsibility 
to the City of Alhambra, its employees, voters, 
or taxpayers. This seems to me to offend democratic 
principles in addition to the basic requirements 
of the City's charter. 
69 C.2d at 385, 445 P.2d at 312, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 696. 
The majority's reasoning can be broken down into several 
*I simplify here somewhat. The ordinance was a proposed 
initiative which had received the needed number of signatures 
but which the City had refused to place on the ballot on grounds 




• (1) What the anti-delegation doctrine really requires is that 
the lawmakers "effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues." 
In many cases, such "resolution" will take the form of "standards" 
set forth by the legislature to guide decisions rendered by others. 
But in other cases,the "fundamental issues" can be resolved even 
without any standard setting. 
( What is the fundamental issue? To a large extent, 
this depends on how the legislature chooses to perceive or 
the problem at hand. The Alhambra lawmakers had 
imp ignated as "fundamental" the "issue" of parity 
between Alhambra wages and Los Angeles wages. So long as this 
~be regarded as the fundamental issue, then Alhambra's 
lawmakers have indeed decided it, and later events in Los Angeles 
City and County which actually determine particular wage levels 
can be regarded as mere matters of application. 
(3) Alhambra's designation of parity as the fundamental 
issue is quite reasonable. Alhambra lawmakers may recognize 
that they will-be _unable to recruit firemen if their wages are 
lower than those in Los Angeles. Also, Alhambra officials may 
appreciate that Los Angeles officials may "possess a superior 
abilityn to review firemen wages in other jurisdictions and to 
engage the research needed for an appropriate salary determina-
necess 
wage s 
Delegation doctrine should take into account the "practical 
" of governmental processes. For example, smaller 
Alhambra face serious problems in gathering the 
appropriate for the formulating of proper 
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(5) What the delegation doctrine calls for is not "standards" 
• as such but rather "safeguards." And an enlightened delegation 
doctrine is primarily concerned with "the degree of protection 
against arbitrariness." nrf an external private or governmental 
body is involved in the application of the legislative scheme, 
it must be an agency that the legislature can expect will reason-
ably perform its function." 69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310, 
71 Cal, Rptr. at 694. Alhambra lawmakers can reasonably assume 
that Los Angeles City and County have no interest in paying 
their firemen excessive or unnecessarily high wages. This 
assumption provides the necessary "safeguard" and the assurance 
of "reasonable performance." 
(6) The Court's general delegation philosophy is set forth 
in an eloquent concluding paragraph. 
Doctrinaire legal concepts should not be invoked 
to impede the reasonable exercise of legislative 
power properly designed to frustrate abuse. Only 
in the event of a total abdication of that power 
through failure either to render basic policy 
decisions or to assure that they are implemented 
as made will this Court intrude on legislative 
enactment because it is an "unlawful delegation," 
and then only to preserve the representative 
character of the process of reaching legislative 
decision. 
69 Cal, 2d at 384, 445 P.2d at 311, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 695. 
While Kugler itself dealt with a local ordinance, its 
discussion of the delegation problem operates at a very general 
level; it is clear, therefore, that Kugler principles apply to 
delegations by the state legislature as well as delegations by 
local governments. For a case so holding, see Martin v. County of 
Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970). In 
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Martin a state statute provided that employees of the Municipal 
• 
Court in Contra Costs (for whose salaries the state is responsible) 
receive the same remuneration as the County chooses to pay its 
own employees in comparable positions. The Court of Appeal, 
applying Kugler, concluded that the statute was plainly constitu-
. tional. The Court interpreted the Martin statute as contemplating 
regular review of the implementation of the statute by the 
Legislature. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 890. This 
review afforded a "safeguard" in the Kugler sense. 
the level of generality of Kugler's discussion of the 
delegation tion, there should be no question but that Kugler 
applied~ at least in a general way, to delegations by the state 
to federal officials. This is proven rather conclusively by an 
example of a lawful delegation which the Kugler opinion volunteers: 
If [a California] statute provides that salaries 
are to be adjusted to future changes in the cost 
of living, the legislature must designate a body, 
such as the United States Department of Labor, 
which may be expected to reasonably perform the 
function of ascertaining the cost of living. 





A. THE EXTENT OF THE DELEGATION 
Any choice by the California Legislature to adopt a general 
rule of complete open-ended conformity, or to participate in the 
Federal-State Tax Collection Act (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361-65), 
would entail a very substantial delegation. First of all, either 
choice would involve a decision to conform the state's income tax 
to federal income tax norms. At least four sorts of decisions 
ordinarily go into the calculation of taxable income. 
The first set of decisions rests on what can be called pure 
tax logic. An example: if long-term capital gains merit special 
tax treatment, this is partly because inflation would otherwise 
overstate the taxpayer's true gain, and partly because without 
special treatment a gain that has materialized over a considerable 
period of time would be unfairly and excessively taxed in one 
year only. _While federal law provides that one year of ownership 
of capital gain for special long-term treatment, California law-
makers have concluded that only five years of ownership merits 
full long-term tre.atment (Revenue & Taxation Code § 18162. 5). 
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on pure tax 
matters of this sort would be eliminated if it opted for complete 
conformity.* 
*I use existing California tax rules to illustrate the 
differences between U.S. and California tax perspectives. Using 
existing rules as illustrations is, however, an imperfect enter-
prise. After all, existing California rules could be overridden 
by a mere incorporation-by-reference (not just by an open-ended 
delegation). Conversely, even in an open-ended conformity regime, 
existing California rules could be protected by attaching specific 
modifications to the conformity rule. See page 64, infra. 
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Tax es are often designed to stimulate or 
moderate the general economy. Thus the special treatment of 
capital gains may also be intended to encourage the process 
of capital formation. The state perspective on the control of 
the general economy may well be different from that of the 
federal perspec (Indeed, the economic terature emphasizes 
that macroeconomic planning is best or at least most frequently 
undertaken at the national level.) If a state does accept 
complete conformity, it would be depriving itself of the oppor-
tunity of influencing macroeconomic policy by way of any state 
income tax rules it might enact or amend. 
Many income tax rules amount to so-called "tax expenditures.~~ 
• .. 
That is, rules on credits, deductions, and the non-taxability of 
forms of income may well be intended by the Legislature to serve 
as subsidies to various classes of persons and to various fo~ 
of activities; these subsidies are often designed to achieve a 
certain allocative effect. Thus the solar energy credit introduced 
into California law in 1976 and then revised in 1977 and 1978 
(Revenue & Taxation Code §§ 17052.5, 17055) is obviously intended 
to encourage property owners' investment in solar energy projects. 
The charitable contribution deduction in both state (Revenue & 
Taxation Code § 17214) and federal law evidently igned at 
least in part. to encourage donations to approved charities. 
However, California's maximum for charitable contributions (20% 
of adjusted gross income) (Revenue & Taxation Code § 17215) is 
much less than the federal 50% maximum; California has thus chosen 
to place meaningful limits on the extent of its subsidy to 
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charitable giving. California's opportunity to make up its 
• 
own mind on matters of this sort would be eliminated by a 
complete conformity poli"cy. 
Finally, income tax law is designed to achieve the goal of 
equity among taxpayers--"horizontal equity," to use standard tax 
parlance. The renters' credit provided for in California law 
(Revenue & Taxation Code § 17053.5) can easily be understood in 
equity terms. Whatever the justifications may be for allowing 
income tax deductions for property taxes and interest payments, 
the truth remains that these deductions provide homeowners with 
enormous tax benefits. The renters' credit is designed to at 
least alleviate the inequality between owners and renters that 
the tax rules otherwise engender. California's opportunity to 
render equity judgments of this sort would be expunged were it 
to elect full conformity. 
To be sure, the state could attach certain "modifications" 
even to an open-ended conformity statute; and the federal Act 
recognizes state interests in a limited number of areas where it 
was obvious to Congress that the state's perspective differs 
from the federal perspective. But limited exceptions of this 
sort apart, modifications and open-ended conformity would require 
state lawmakers to abandon the enterprise of state income-tax 
policymaking .. The "social" as well as the "economic" aspects 
of this policymaking were referred to in Wallace in invalidating 
Minnesota's conformity statute. 
Even if the state does decide to conform or to participate 
in the federal program, however, important state prerogatives 
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respecting tax policy would be preserved. Under piggybacking, 
whichever of the§ 6362(a)(2) options it elects, the participat-
ing state would retain full authority to set the general level 
of the state income tax burden. The extent of this burden is 
one of the most important features of income tax policymaking. 
Also, by choosing option§ 6362(a)(2)(A) rather than§ 6362(a)(2)( 
the state would retain full authority over the state income tax 
rate structure. If the state does retain this power, then it 
reserves for itself the authority to determine the progress 
of the state income tax--that is, the extent to which the tax 
attempts to achieve the so-called goal of "vertical equity. ' 
And under conformity without piggybacking, the statute obviously 
retains full control both over tax burden and over progress 
In these respects, however, California presently stands 
a rather special situation, given the pendency of Proposi 9. 
In the absence of Proposition 9, the above comments on 
servation of state authority over tax burden and rate structure 
are accurate. If Proposition 9 passes, however, the California 
Constitution would prevent the California Legislature from rais 
any tax rate above 50 percent of what that rate is now. Under 
Proposition 9, therefore, the only power the state Legis 
would retain over the level of tax burden is the power to 
that burden to less than 50 percent of its present level; 
Legislature could affect the progressivity of the state income 
tax only by reducing particular rates to less than 50 percent 
their current levels--not by raising any rates to above that 
point. Proposition 9, by vastly curtailing the discretion 
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the state Legislature would otherwise possess under the federal 
• 
Act, correspondingly enhances the extent to which the adoption 
of conformity would work a state-to-federal delegation. 
(In another way, however, Proposition 9 diminishes the 
delegation. By reducing tax rates to no more than 50 percent 
of their present levels, Proposition 9 would proportionately 
reduce the monetary effects of all tax rules on includability 
and deductability, decision-making power over which the Act 
would exclusively assign to the federal government. By depriving 
these rules of at least half of their practical impact, 
Proposition 9 would to some extent mollify the delegation 
objection.) 
Discussed above is the extent to which a decision in favor 
of full conformity would delegate state lawmaking powers. But 
if California chooses not only to conform but also to participate 
in the federal program, this latter choice would seemingly enhance 
the delegation in a dramatic way. For under the Act, administra-
tion of the income tax would become exclusively (or almost exclu-
sively) a federal responsibility. In the first instance, the 
basic responsibility for auditing taxpayer returns would rest with 
the federal government. (Note, however, the observation by 
Professor Stoltz that, while a "cursory reading of the statute 
might result in the . . . conclusion that the law prohibits 
supplemental state audit activity," this reading is "mistaken"; 
"it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not 
intend to prohibit supplemental state auditing efforts. Thus a 
state with a high level of audit activity could continue such 
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activity as a supplement to the federal effort." See Stoltz & 
• 
Purdy, Federal Collection of State Income Taxes, 1977 Duke L.J. 
61, 109. However, even under Stoltz's view of the Act, any state 
auditing would be wholly "supplemental" or advisory in nature.) 
Under the Act all decisions as to whether to initiate 
enforcement proceedings would evidently be rendered by federal 
officials. All tax litigation, either initiated by the govern-
ment or by the taxpayer in seeking a refund, would take place in 
federal court rather than in state court. Section 636l(b). 
Federal officials, and those officials alone, would have the 
power and responsibility "to represent state interests" in all 
administrative and judicial proceedings. Section 636l(d)(l)(a). 
In securing enforcement, only those civil and criminal penalties 
provided for by federal law could be resorted to. Section 636l(a). 
Any penalties which state law might profess to provide for taxpayer 
violations of the state tax would be regarded as an impermissib 
form of "double jeopardy." Section 6362(f)(6). 
The federalization of the administration of the state income 
tax which these various provisions would affect suggests that a 
state's decision to participate in the federal program would 
amount to a colossal delegation of a sort unprecedented (so far 
as I know) in Americ.an federal history. Not only state legislative 
power, but state executive and judicial power, would all be 
transferred to the federal government. (Note, however, that the 
special constitutional rules on the delegation of state judicial 
power all pertain to statutes which remand seemingly judicial 
matters to administrative agencies for primary decisionmaking. 
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Under the federal Act, matters which are presently decided by 
the state judiciary would be submitted instead to the judi ary 
of the federal government. There is thus no abandonment of the 
taxpayer's right to a judicial decision--the right which those 
special rules seek to vindicate. While the delegation of state 
judicial powers to the federal government should certainly 
"count" in assessing the extent and the implications of the 
overall delegation, it does not seem to raise any independent 
delegation question.) 
The above paragraphs have attempted to evaluate the character 
of the delegation which full conformity or piggybacking would 
constitute. But enormous benefits would also result from decis 
* to conform or to piggyback. Many of those benefits would accrue 
to individual taxpayers. Under conformity. taxpayers would secure 
welcome advantages in terms of the reduced time (or monetary cost) 
involved in preparing state income tax returns. And in addition 
to tax preparation savings, the process of tax planning would also 
simplified, insofar as this planning would now need to reckon 
with only one se~ of income tax rules. 
State government also would reap substantial savings. A 
conformity policy would greatly reduce that administrative burden 
on the state bureaucracy which is presently engendered by the 
differential between state and federal tax rules. Moreover, given 
the provisions in the federal Act as amended, participation in 
Act would enable the state to achieve further savings by way of 
*These benefits are well described in the general literature 
on conformity, and I describe them only briefly here. 
94 
57 
the elimination of the costly state personal income tax 
• 
administrative apparatus. 
Benefits would also be achieved by way of conserving the 
resources of the state Legislat~re itself. Since the Legis 
has in the past recognized the obvious advantages of conformity, 
substantial amounts of legislative effort have been expended in 
reviewing changes in federal income tax law and in determining 
which of those changes the state, in the name of conformity, should 
choose to adopt'. Adoption of an open-ended conformity rule would 
liberate the state Legislature from this burden on its energies. 
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DELEGATION 
In circumstances of this sort, where a delegation achieves 
enormous benefits but also deprives the state of important 
ity, how should the California analyst think about the cons tu-
tional question? 
My basic ass~tion here is that Kugler v. Yokum is the 
relevant judicial authority. While Kugler immediately deals with 
a municipal ordinance, the Kugler discussion of delegation is 
deliberately couched at a level of generality which makes it 
seemingly relevant to delegations of every sort. That Kugler 
principles apply to delegations by the state is thus obvious 
enough from the Kugler opinion itself, and has since been verified 
by Martin. Those Kugler principles are explicitly concerned with 
the problem of inter-jurisdictional delegations; and an examp 
which the Kugler opinion explicitly advances (a state statute 
giving effect to future changes in the cost of living as determined 
by the federal Department of Labor) makes it sufficiently clear 
that Kugler can be applied to delegations from the state to the 
federal government. To this extent Kugler takes precedence over 
language in Burke and Brock--language which was, after all, no more 
than dictum (if that), and which was challenged from an early 
by the strong Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. In any event, 
the Rule that state delegations to the federal government are per 
se invalid seems to be exactly the kind of "doctrinaire" delegation 
concept which the Kugler opinion inveighs against. 
Assuming that Kugler applies, what results does it suggest? 
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Here there are two alternatives to consider: an open-ended 
conformity statute; and participation in the federal program. 
Here the important initial point is that each of these alterna-
tives seems to comply with the Kugler criteria for a valid dele-
gation. Kugler allows the legislative body to determine what 
the "fundamental issue" is and then endorses whatever delegations 
result from the legislature's resolution of that issue. In 
reviewing both the general advantages of conformity and the addi-
tional advantages of piggybacking, the California Legislature 
c.ould reasonably conclude that the "fundamental issue" for per-
sonal income tax purposes is whether the state should approve of 
conformity and accept the federal invitation--whether the multi-
ple advantages of conformity justify the reduction in state 
authority. In Kugler itself, the Court agreed that Alhambra could 
characterize the "fundamental issue" in terms of whether the 
advantages of compensation parity outweighed the corresponding 
loss of city discretion. Especially if the Legislature's vote 
rests on the basis of an adequate deliberation (a good legislative 
record would be helpful in this regard), the Legislature will have 
rendered decision on the fundamental issue and to that extent 
discharged its Kugler obligations. 
Kugler does suggest that a legislature's resolution of the 
fundamental issue must meet minimum standards of reasonableness 
or responsibility. But certainly the advantages of conformity 
and also of piggybacking are substantial enough to confirm the 
plausibility of a legislative decision which seeks to obtain them. 
Kugler requires that if an "external governmental body" is implicated 
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a legislative scheme, the legislature must be able to expect 
that this body "will reasonably perform its fw"'"lction." Certainly 
the Legislature could possess this expectation vis-a-vis the 
federal government. If Alhambra can reasonably assume that Los 
Angeles City and County will not pay their firemen excessively, 
so California can reasonably assume that federal authorities 
have no incentive either to develop oppressive income or deduction 
* rules or to foolishly fritter away the income tax base. If 
Alhambra can recognize the greater information-gathering resources 
of Los Angeles City and County, so the California Legislature could 
reasonably place confidence in the general income-tax sophistication 
of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service. 
As noted in Part I-D, there are a number of judicial decisions 
upholding open-ended state tax conformity statutes. These decis 
validated conformity because of the benefits they perceived conform-
ity as achieving: "convenience to the taxpayer" and "economy to 
the state" (or "simplicity of administration"). The recognition 
of these benefits in this cluster of cases provides support for 
the Kugler idea that· the Legislature, if it votes in favor of 
open-ended conformity, will have rendered a responsible judgment 
on the fundamental issue. (The only complication is found in 
Mullaney's suggestion that "labor saving" on the part of the 
Legislature should not count as a legitimate benefit. On this 
complication, see the discussion of Sharpnack below.) As for the 
*Compare Cheney, p. 22, in which a state legislature sought 
to utilize--for income tax purposes--a formula worked out by the 
I.C.C. for quite different rate regulation purposes. 
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elimination of state administrative costs which would result if 
the state were to agree to piggybacking, implicit in Streets and 
Highways Code § 820 and in the Supreme Court's Eden Park opinion is 
the idea that it may well be sensible for the state to forsake some 
of its prerogatives in order to secure the benefits available from 
federal programs. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sharpnack 
reinforces the Kugler argument in favor of open-ended conformity. 
Sharpnack holds, in line with Kugler, that the advantages of con-
formity or parity can justify an open-ended inter-jurisdictional 
delegation. In Sharpnack there had been a longstanding Congres-
sional policy of conforming federal enclave law with the law of 
the state in which the enclave was located. Given all its experi-
ence with incorporation-by-reference measures, Congress could 
(according to the Court) reasonably take the small additional leap 
involved in approving an ongoing delegation. In like manner, the 
California Legislature has long displayed a strong interest in 
conforming the state's income tax laws with those of the federal 
government. Russell Bock's 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes is 
helpful in revealing the extent of that interest. The text of 
that Guidebook reveals that most existing California personal 
income tax rules do indeed conform (or at least adequately "compare") 
to federal tax rules. And Bock's _summary of 1979 California income 
tax legislation (at pages 7-9) verifies that the clear majority 
of all the income tax measures which the Legislature enacted in a 
seemingly typical year were motivated by the Legislature's general 





The contains one complication, 
Congressional experience described in Sharpnack revealed an 
undeviating practice of past conformity. But with respect to 
ome tax law, the California Legislature, while it has usual 
sen to conform to the federal model, in any number of signifi-
cant particulars has declined to conform (either by failing to 
act or by acting in a nonconforming way). As for this comp ca-
tion, however, the state Legislature is clearly entitled to 
reflect, in a retrospective and comprehensive way, upon the 
lessons of its experience. And as it considers the state's 
income tax in its existing whole--as it reviews the pattern of 
state-federal deviations which its individual decisions (or 
indecisions) have produced--the Legislature could plausibly cone 
that the process of state lawmaking has not been successful 
producing benefits commensurate with that process's taxpayer 
titutional costs. If the Legislature's resulting decis to 
conserve on its own labor (by way of open-ended conformity) rests 
on a reasonable finding that its labor has not been produc 
expended in the past, then the goal of "labor saving"--that is, 
of deploying the Legislature's scarce resources to their maximum 
public advantage--seems commendable rather than illicit in 
character. 
For all of these reasons, however. a Kugler analys 
reinforced by Sharpnack, seemingly supports the legali of an 
open-ended delegation, and even of piggybacking. There are, 
however, two objections to consider. 
The first concerns the possibility of state legislative 
oversight. Oversight is certainly one form of "safeguard" 
a legation; and Kugler makes clear that safeguards are ess 1 
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to constitutionality. Under "mere" ongoing conformity, the 
• Legislature could (and undoubtedly should) set up a formal 
mechanism to apprise itself of any significant changes in federal 
income tax law and to develop a policy analysis of each of those 
changes. With the help of the information and analyses which this 
mechanism would contribute, the Legislature would be in a good 
position to consider whether any modifications of its conformity 
policy are warranted. (See the discussion above of the report-
making "safeguard" in Streets & Highways Code § 820 and of the 
statute in Martin.) But the situation is very different if 
California chooses to participate in the federal piggybacking pro-
gram. As a matter of formal law, a decision by a state like 
California to participate woulrl be reversible, so long as the 
state makes up its mind within the deadline which the federal 
Act stipulates. Practically speaking, however, such a decision 
to participate may well be irreversible. Once a state, in joining 
the federal program, dismantles its personal income tax bureaucracy. 
it would be extremely difficult for the state legislature to with-
draw from the ~rogram if the legislature should undergo any change 
of heart. Thus a state's acceptance of the federal piggybacking 
invitation may well be effectively permanent in character. Kugler 
requires courts to consider the "practical necessities" of 
governmental processes. Here, a "practical" evaluation suggests 
that the state Legislature may have little ability to act should 
it later determine that a particular new federal tax rule is 
obnoxious to state policy or that its original decision to 
participate in the federal program seems no longer supportable. 
From a delegation perspective, all of this is disturbing. 
1 n 1 
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The second objection concerns the "scope" or extens s 
the delegation in question. Is "scope" relevant at all 
delegation law? Th~s is uncertain. The extreme breadth of the 
ter statute seemingly influenced the Schecter Court its ----
ruling of unconstitutionality. Yet. faced with a statute of 
moderate breadth in Sharpnack. the Supreme Court simply ignored 
the concern for scope expressed in Justice Douglas's dissenting 
opinion. Kugler is the fountainhead of contemporary California 
law, and Kugler, in stating delegation standards, pays no heed 
to scope. But the actual ordinance which was before the Kugler 
Court--dealing only with firemen compensation--was obviously 
rather narrow in scope. Perhaps it is best to assume that if 
the scope of a delegation is sufficiently extreme, then scope has 
at least some bearing on the constitutional question. 
The scope of the delegation under an open-ended conformity 
statute is doubtless broad. Yet it does not seem at all extreme 
when compared to the federal NRA, ruled on in Schecter. Note. 
however, that a piggybacking delegation contains additional 
distinctive elements of breadth. Piggybacking, like conformity, 
would transfer· tax-law policymaking to the federal government; but 
piggybacking, ~like conformity, would also transfer near-comp te 
authority over the administration of the state's income tax. 
(''Administration" in this context includes prosecutorial 
judicial authority, and the authority to establish a s 
sanctions and penalties.) 
Even as for the transfer of tax-law policymaking, there is an 
additional important point to make--which is that under ongoing 
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conformity (but not under piggybacking) there would be a meaningful 
• 
if limited opportunity for state control on the absoluteness of 
that transfer. As the record in other jurisdictions shows, a 
state like California could easily combine a general rule of ongoing 
conformity with at least a limited number of "modifications" which 
could be capable of taking strong interests into account. Modifi-
cations of this sort could, for example, enable California to adhere 
to its past policy on the solar energy credit, on the renter's 
* credit, and on the low ceiling on charitable contributions. Of 
course, the power to modify would also provide a legislative outlet 
for the ongoing policy reviews of new federal tax rules, as described 
at page 63. The modification feature of an open-ended conformity 
statute thus enables the state to qualify its delegation of policy-
making power in a way that confirms the assessment that this de 
is something less than extreme. A state would possess no similar 
modifying ability, however, should it undertake to piggyback. 
The assessment of the two objections thus leads to the 
following conclusions. There is very good reason to believe that 
an open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional £y 
the California Supreme Court. Open-ended conformity fully complies 
with the Kugler criteria, and the delegation, while much wider in 
scope than the delegations ruled on and described in Kugler, could 
be effectively safeguarded by a formalized process of legislative 
review, and kept under control by a legislative willingness to 
*It would be not easy--though perhaps not impossible--to handle 





consider at least a limited number of modifications. A piggyb 
decision could also be supported by Kugler. But here the "scope" 
of the delegation seems more extreme, insofar as it both excludes 
the state's power to "modify" and remits full judicial, adminis-
trative, and sanction-setting authority to the federal government. 
Also, a Kugler consideration of the "practical necessities" of 
governmental operations suggests the probable absence of the 
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"safeguard" of effective legislative review of the continuing 
correctness of the original legislative decision. In these 
circumstances, the only prediction that can claim to be candid 
is one that recognizes that the Supreme Court could easily rule 
either way on piggybacking--either extending Kugler to affirm the 
state's participation in the federal program, or interpreting 
Kugler narrowly and thereby invalidating that participation. 
(An added uncertainty concerns the character of the "scrutinyiY 
which the Supreme Court would give to any California decision to 
piggyback. For purposes of applying Kugler, should piggybacking 
be compared to the present California situation, or should it be 
compared instead to the intermediate possibility of open-ended 
conformity without piggybacking. The calculation of the benefits 
of piggybacking--as well as the calculation of the delegation 
detriments--importantly depends on what the basis for comparison 
is. Yet I find little in Kugler that offers guidance as to how 
this undertainty should be resolved. Of course, since no state 
has yet chosen to participate in the federal program, there has 
been no opportUnity to secure any judicial views on delegation 
doctrine in this vexing application. By contrast, as Part I-D 
has shown, we do have case law on open-ended conformity statutes. 
While the courts' opinions have hardly been uniform, neither have 
they been unsympathetic to the conformity cause. Several have ruled 
in favor of the constitutionality of ongoing conformity; and the 
only contrary holding may have rested on that state's peculiarly 
restrictive constitutional language.) 
lOS 
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C. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
One of my conclusions, reported above, is that it is very 
likely that the California Supreme Court would find constitutional 
an open-ended tax conformity rule adopted by the state Legislature. 
In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of a contrary prediction 
expressed in an Opinion of the Office of Legislative Counsel, dated 
October 19, 1959. 
If I am right in recognizing the 1968 Kugler as the outstand-
ing California authority on the delegation question, then it 
follows that the Legis~ative Counsel's 1959 Opinion has simply been 
superseded by later judicial developments. It also may be proper 
to mention that the Legislative Counsel's Opinion seems rather 
selective in its methodology. In discussing California law, for 
example, that Opinion refers to the Supreme Court's language in 
Brock, Burke, and Palermo; but it does not mention the strong 
Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. As for out-of-state law, 
it refers to early opinions like Santee Mills and Featherstone, 
which had indicated doubts on the delegation question; but it does 
not mention an early case like Underwood Typewriter, which had 
sustained an open-ended conformity statute. The Opinion disparages 
the Ninth Circuit's sympathetic discussion of delegation in 
Mullaney on grounds that the discussion was mere dictum. Yet in 
referring to the California Supreme Court's more negative language 
in Brock, Burke, and Palermo, the Opinion fails to indicate 
quite limited role which that language played in those three 
Court opinions. Moreover, the Opinion does not even mention the 




had been rendered within the previous year, and even though 
• Palermo had itself recognized the relevance, as analogy, of the 
federal Assimilative Crimes Act. 
My second conclusion is that piggybacking raises a state 
constitutional issue that is effectively too close to call. By 
suggesting at least the possibility of unconstitutionality, this 
conclusion warrants a bit of amplification. Assume Congress 
passes a statute imposing a supplement to the existing federal 
income tax and providing that the proceeds of this supplementary 
tax be distributed (in a revenue-sharing manner) back to the 
states according to a formula that gives priority to the state 
of taxpayer origin. Since both the taxing and spending features 
of this federal statute entail fully federal activities requiring 
no collaboration by the state, nothing in a state's constitution 
has any bearing on the program's legality. Assume now that Congress 
adds to that program the rule that a state becomes entitled to its 
share of the federal-tax supplement only if the state agrees to 
impose no income tax of its own--only if the state repeals, for 
example, any existing state laws providing for such a tax. Possibly. 
this Congressional scheme would "coerce" the states in a manner that 
is impermissible under the federal Constitution. Compare Steward 
· Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), with National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). and Brown v. EPA, 431 U.S. 
99 (1977). Yet since the tax in question would remain a genuinely 
federal tax, and since the only action which the state legislature 
would need to take would be to repeal its own existing tax statute 




the federal program, even as so revised, creates any problems 
under the state's constitution. 
The program contemplated by the Federal-State Income Tax 
Collection Act possesses important elements of similarity with 
the programs hypothesized above. Nevertheless, under that Act 
the tax in question is emphatically a state tax. It is conceived 
of as a state tax by the entire text of the Act itself; the 
state retains the authority to determine the tax's overall burden 
and perhaps even the tax rate structure; and of course the Act 
gives the states full choice as to whether to participate in the 
program in the first place. The state thus possesses much more ----
authority under the Act than it would possess under the revised 
hypothetical program; and exactly because of the extent of that 
authority, a state constitutional question arises as to the extent 
to which the state has relieved itself of other authority. There 
is irony in this of course--but it is irony of the sort that 
recurs in constitutional reasoning, especially in this complex era 
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PERSONAL INCOME TAXES. Legislative Constitutional Amend-· 
ment. Legislature may provide for reporting and collecting YES 
4 
California personal income taxes by reference to provisions of 
present or future laws of the United States and may prescribe 
exceptions and modifications thereto. Prohibits in state 
personal income tax rates based on future changes federal NO 
rates. 
(This E.mendment proposed Senate Con- erence to !l.llY provision of laws of the 
stitutional An1endment No. 18, Regular United States as the same be or become 
Sfssicm, does not expressly amend any exist-
ing section of the Constitution, but adds a 
new section thereto; therefore, the provisions 
thereof are printed in BLACK-FACED 
TYPE to indicate they are NEW.) 
effective s.t any time or from time to time, 
and may or modifica.-
tionll. 
provision of the laws 
of shall not refer to the 
amount of any federal tax on, in respect to, 
or merumred by, personal income which ill PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 
ARTICLE XIII under !l.llY provision of the federa.l 
laws. 
Bee. 11~. (a) Except 1!.!1 in sub-
division (c), the Legislature may simplify 
the reporting and collecting of California 
personal income taxes, notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Conlltitution, by ref-
(c) The Legisla.ture shall not enact !l.lly 
llta.tnte which directly or indirectly 
General Analyais by the 
Legiala.tive Counsel 
A "Yes" vote on this meMure is a vote to 
authorize the Legislature to adopt, by refer-
ence, future amendments to federal l&Wll for 
the purpose of reporting and collectinr Cali- I 
lornia personal income taxeli. r ' 
A "No" vote is a vote to deny the Legisla-: 
ture this authority. · 
For further details see below. 
Deta.lled Analysis by the 
Legisla.tive Counsel 
·· Tbe State Constitution hu been eon&trued 
u preventing the Legislature, in adoptinr, 
federal laws for state purpose~~, from adopt-· 
lng future amendments to federal laWL i 
Tbia measure, if approved by the voters,, 
would add Section lli to Artiele XTII of the; 
Constitution to permit the Legislature-to in- i 
corporate provisions of the federal law as 
t:hey may be enacted or amended in the fu. 
tur.e, u well as to incorporate existinc pro-
villiou of federal law, so as to make t~. 
provisions apply to the reporting and eollee-
tion of atate income taxes. The federal law,: 
1110 incorporated, would be made subj~t to 0 
exceptions or modifications, if any, that die 
Le-gislature might prescribe. 
Tke measure would specifically prohibit 
ineorporation by reference into the state law 
of the amount of any federal tax on, in re-
spect to, or measured by; personal income 
which is computed under provision of tile 
federal laws. 
Tbe mei!.I!Ure would, in addition, prohibit 
the enactment by the Legislature of any 
lltatute providing, either directly or indi-
netly, few a eh!l.llp in the rates of the ~~tate 
pttaoWal income tax based on future eha.np 
in federal peraon&l income tax rata. 
for a. change in state personl!J. income tax 
rates based upon future changes in personal 
incoma tax rates of the United Sta.W. 
Argument in Favor of Proposition lfo.' 
At l!l.!lt Here is a proposal to make our 
atate income tax easier to figure out. 
0 A YES vote on this proposition will allow 
the Legislature to conform state income tax 
laws as much as practical to federal income 
tax laws. This would me!l.ll we could use the 
~alcul.ation~ made for federal tax purposes 
In filling out our state tax form. There ia no 
reMon why the burden of taxation should 
be made even Califm:--
Dia taxpl!lyem the tim.--
IUUllllnc proee~~~~~ hs.vinr ,nil 
eompute a complicated state 
differe.nt fro• tJae federal fol'IIL We 
Bot 88Cept the federal tax ~. Ja 
&~·~~~~~~~~~ 
present law we. make additillllllil, 
subtraction~~, !l.lld computations necessary fer 
t:he federal tax form and then go through ,u 
e.ntirely d.il!'erent process for the state tliiJt 
ret11rll. For those who hire aecount!l.lltlil to 
prepare their form~~, this 
There are now many differe1ac•~ bebr~~~GI!Il 
the federal law and the &tate law. Thia 
ponl will el!.!le administration !l.lld 
u returns will be eMier to !l.lld 
Thia will simplify the atate return 
min on the sise of the form. - . 
The,vast of the section~~ of Ole 
federal income and the state 
tax law are similar now-but the few 
ferences that do exist are the ".,.'""""' 
we seek to simplify with this co:nstihttic)IU!l 
amendment. 
We are away our own power 
to make neceiiiiiUJ" changes in our tax 1&1n1 
in the futun. we simply sar th!"i the present 
111 
feden.l of eompubng Income 
eeptable 'WI &nd should be mc:orno.ra!,ea 
our state law. At time in the 
Legislature may that a 
new federal law would ,.,,,.,.,."~'"' 
state financial structure and we could 
that change. Thus, our own State 
will retain the to write our 
ao they will fit the economy of Califor-
nia's taxpayers. 
The California conducted a 
two-year study of our 11trueture 
proposal is one of the recommendations that 
Wl!.!l made. A number of states have already 
adopted this system, and most of our profe~~­
sional and accounting societies are 1rnp-
SENATOR JAMES R. »u.-'-LU.., 
San Diego 




California votem &hould vote NO on Prop-
osition 4 for the reason~~: 
meuure vropoaE!S, 
iaW'll to 




for increases in 
not be 
~md W asbington. The 
the tllx dollar 
.,,,..., . .,,.,.,..,1.,. to the electorat. 
for levying tax. This is the best ~USU:r!moe 
tbat your elected will caN-
fully balance the of taxpayen awl 
the beneflciariea of 11tate appropriation~~. 
A NO vote on P:rop011ition 4 will proteet 
the wages of the lower ineoli!MI 
~md in California. 
A NO on Propooition 4 
all Californians that tax laws 
made by California h~2:islat<ll"'l, 
n!t~nl!!entltti,~ea from l!tatea .. 
bow proposal will do 
U<.rnav,Pr. Ita im-
intoomr 
HUCH>Ulillll to VOte 
RICHARD J. DOL WIG 
California State Senator 
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Reagan's Tax Cuts Leave States in a Bind 
Because ofLinks. With Federal Formuf® 
A WALL SThh:ltT JoUJtNAL NrwsRounthip } 
Passage of President Reagan's tax-cut I 
program has to~ additional burdens oo 
stat!' gowrnments that alrrady are scram-1 
hlmg :o deal with reducuons in federal ald. 
lkrause most states have linked at least 
part of th~>lr tax formulas to tht> federal gov·j 
•·rnnwnt's, th(' swt•Ppln~r tax cuts enacted, by . 
< :.m;:n·:..<; have lt>ft tht> state ¥tJVernm~nts 11 
!ac-111~ n•v('nue 10!1/.ies estlmlltl'd at as much 
as s:u 1J11!10n In the first year after the fed· II 
eral act takes effect. · 
"'There's no question that the federal gov· 1 
ernment has put us in a bind," said Lt. Gov. I 
James Green of North Carolina. 
Rift 1n Ohlo 
The chuge In the federal depreciaUon 
schedule has created a rift In the 0100 lePI-
Iatu~. with the state house pushing for con-
tmuance of the old federiO standards for 
state tax purposes and the senate arguiJl.g 
that the state "should be moving iD the 
same direction as Congress," Mr. Levin 
said. 
But somP other states, notably California. 
wnn't bt· afh'<'tP<I si'-'ltlflcanUy by thl' new 
ft-d•·ral rl•·pN'<'IUUon n1l('s. California hu Ill! 
own biJ::Oiness lax C!)(lt', whl<"h Isn't link~ to, 
the fl'de~~~ .ronnula.. "We. dlcbl't make that l 
mhitalu·. <.ov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. said. 
N"w federal depreciation schedules and ~ West Virginia, wh1ch depends primarily 
inct•n!ives for savers are expected to cause on business and occupation taxes for reve-
the bi~:"gest drains on state revenue. To a nue rather than the corporate income tax, 
lesser extent. immediate cuts in personal in· will see an "almost insignlficam" reduction 
com!' taxes. and the indexing to take effect in its revenue, said Herschel Rose, tax cam-
In 1!1!!.'>. also are expected to dlmln!Bh state missioner. 
fund:>. Alrrady, some states have proposed 
laws sevrring the links between state and One major tax break for savers also 
!edl'ral tax formulas. could make deep Inroads In atate ~ri. 
The tux-exempt "All-Savers" certlncates 
The cuts in corporate Income taxes that could drive up Interest rates on competlllf • 
will follow the raster depreciation wrtte-offs state and municipal notes and bonda. I 
in the federal bill wtll cost the states lUI tso· ' Individuals are acquiring about half the 
mated S2 billion In the first year, according dollar value of new municipal bonds and 
to the National GQvernors Association. · notes, according to John E. Petersen, dlrec-
or the 4!i states wtth eorporate Income tor of the Government Ftnuce Research 
taxes. 35 use federal Q6t'bt1Uofts of taxable Center, the research arm of the Munldpall 
income, while 26 autoln&UcaUy adopt fed· , Finance Officers Association. The threatened 
eral depreciation schedula. loss of half, or $10 billion, of that private 
Losses for the StaUIS , market would push up tax-exempt nr.tes ooe 
percentage point, and that could coat the 
state and local governments about $620 mil· 
lion a year In extra Interest cosu, be est!· 
mated. The National GQvemon Asllodatlon 
estimated that cost at S300 million tor tBe 
states. 
One liberal tax-research group, Citizens 
for Tax Justice, has estimated that 2$ 
states. Including populous New York,~ 
Jersey, Ohio. Pennsylvania and Ill · 
stand to lose more than $15 billion over the I 
next six years because of the faster depre-
ciation rates. 
Uls3es to lndlvlduaJ states have been es· 
tlmated at as much as $45 million to $60 mil· 
lion In the first year for Ma.uach~ $15 · 
million for Kentucky, $33 million ~or· 
ida, $12 million for North carolina. m·mll• I 
lion for Minnesota, $30 m!Dkm to $311·~ 
for Georgia, $7 million for~ IIJid $70 
million to SIOO million for Pennsylvama. · 
"States must move qUickly to amend 
their laws where necesh..ry and mnst be 
steadfast against corporate ~ for 
conformity if they are to avokl evq more 
severe cutback~ In state se~es or In· 
creased state and local taxea on worldnr 
prople." the tax group ~d. 
Based on an earlier version of Uie fe<Mra.l 
true bill, Ohio's Department of Taxation sev-
eral months ago estimated the state would 
lose Slll million In tax revenue In fiscal 191!2 
and sso million In fiscal 1983. Those loss esti-
mates were based on Ohio adopting the fed· 
era! changes In depreciation schedules as 
well as the change In the tax on married 
couples when both Sj)OI.IlleS work, says Rich· 
ard A. Levin, director of research for the 
"There aren't a whole Jot of taxable 
transactions when somebody puts money an 
the bank," sald Ken Cory, California state 
treasurer. Tbe state borrows RVeral 
hundred milUon dollars a year. he said, but 
"we're more worried about reneml Interest 
rates than the All-Savers plu." 
Ohio's budget director, William D. Kelp, 
Bald the All-Savers certll'lcates wtll ha:ve lit· 
tie effect In states like Ohio, which he said 1
1 
sells most of Its bonds to Insurance compa· 
!lies and other Institutions. 
In New Y~k. Michael!· De!Giudice,
1 
flllll!l¥. Kucfl Cat-ey'• ~ of. ~ man· 
~nt. said New York's bon'c1wiftl' plans 
will be affected ":somewhat" by the compe-
Ution from All·Savers certificates, but he 
said the state hasn't decided what ch~~qe 
wm be made. 
He estimated that the entire paclta,e of 
! flederal cuts in the tax bill would cost New 
i York $30 million In the current fiscal year, 
ending next March :n. $100 million in t!scal 
; 1983, and "upwards of $200 mUIIon" each 
; year after that. 
114 
• I 
Richard A. Levin. director rt"'!t'aN 
for the Ohlo Department of Taxation. sa 
Indexing, which adjusts per:>onallncome t£ 
rates to offset Inflation. won't affect m 
state, because Ohio's Income tax Is~ c 
federal adjusted gross Income. Indem 
changes the amount of tax on Income. tli 
. the amount of Income Itself, Mr. Levin said 
One change that will decrease the state 
tax bite, Mr. Levin said, Is the redue>td t!l 
a married couple will pay when 004 
BpOIIses are employed. 
Under that law. a couple will be 
to deduct 5'ro of the Income of the 
.nth the lower Income Ul 1981 and 
~ lowed to deduct i0'7o of that Income Ill 
~Mr. Ltlvin Wd Obio ~imli.tes It 
113 million In Its &cal ~ear 
: 1983, IUid S'l1 mill\on In #lscal 
i Che lAw. · , , 
1 But Hi states actml.lly will piA frcm U: 
w cuts beuuse they .allow d~ 
fedlera.l tax peyments. :ne 1111• ·dedu 
UoG at federal taxes will leave l"ee!~l 
, wi(h more Income for the states to tax. 
The three states that "pig~." c 
base their taxes on taxpayer's federal lb.bt 
ttles. may abandon that ~m. ldjm 
tht> "pigiO'back" ratt> w allow for ~ rec 
tral cut.a, or cut spend!nr. Nebruka Ta 
CornmlalOI'H.'r Fnod Hen111Br.on A)'!& that " 
we dldft't do uythlnr. we'd I'Uil out t 
mOII{'y," but the state probll.bly won't abar 
don piggybacking. ··It saves too muc. 
money and It's too convenient." he &ald. 
Few Expect Tu L'lcrease~ 
wtllle some state 9fficlals are 
leg1slati0n to 110tten file effect! of 
tax cut~; few say they wllJ Increase taxes. 
"TJI!i governor j'u.lit won't raise taxes,' 
I 
New York's ~r. OeiGiildlce saki. "We'l 
make up for the losses In spendlng cuts." 
And wnile many state oHlclals are dis 
I mayed at findmg their own budgets carriec 
along on the tide of Mr. Reagan's tax cuts 
m<my seem optimistic that if the new fed 
eral tax policies succeed in Uu 
economy. the ~tate~ wlll txmem. 
.. In California, we have 11 lot of ~.~t:!~;r~&o 
rqntracton~ and we ~d do 
l.llc~ military 1001"(1 
~Y into the ~ economy, Mr. Col") 
said. . . 
":We ob~ .can ablorb ~ reduc· 
tkiM tf we bw a ~e ill !.hit econ· 
omy," said Pennsylvania's P.obert C. WI!· 
bw'tl, Secretary of Budget and Admlmstra· 
Uoft. "That's the bli question." 

